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NOTES
Civil Rights-State Action is a Requirement for the Application
of Section 1985(3) to First Amendment Rights
For a century after its initial enactment as section 2 of the Ku Klux
Klan Act, 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3)1 was an unpopular and seldomly
used civil rights remedy. However, in 1971 in Griffin v. Breckenridge2
-the United States Supreme Court revitalized section 1985(3) by elimi-
nating state action3 as a necessary element for recovery in suits involving
racial discrimination. By limiting its holding in Griffin -to the type of
private conspiracy being challenged in that particular case, the Court
left two important issues concerning the scope of section 1985(3)
unanswered: first, to what forms of discrimination other than racial dis-
crimination would section 1985(3) apply;4 and second, whether section
5 of the fourteenth amendment empowered Congress to protect four-
teenth-amendment-based rights against private action.5 In Bellamy
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970). Section 1985(3) states in relevant part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise
on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving,
either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protec-
tion of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; . . .
in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons en-
gaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of
such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or de-
prived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery
of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more
of the conspirators.
2. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
3. Id. at 101. The requirement of state action had been imposed twenty years
earlier in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951). The effect of requiring state
action was to limit application of section 1985(3) to use in actions that were more easily
established under other civil rights statutes. As a result, prior to Griffin, section
1985(3) was infrequently and unsuccessfully used. Note, Constitutional Law-Section
1985(3) of the Civil Rights Act of 1871-Color of Law Element Eliminated-Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 199, 199.
4. 403 U.S. at 102 n.9. One writer suggests that the Court virtually restricted the
holding to cases involving racial discrimination by basing the constitutionality of the
section primarily on thirteenth amendment grounds. Note, Civil Rights: Are Private
Conspiracies Redressable in Federal Courts?, 25 U. Mmzf L. Itv. 780 (1971).
However, because of the quoted language in the text accompanying note 21 infra, and
because the Court also based the constitutionality on Congress' power to protect the right
to travel and specifically stated that it was not implying the absence of any other
constitutional basis, the correctness of this suggestion is unlikely. 403 U.S. at 105-07.
5. The Supreme Court specifically avoided the issue whether Congress has power
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to reach private conspiracies. 403 U.S. at
107.
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v. Mason's Stores, Inc.6 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was
squarely confronted with these questions in determining whether
section 1985(3) would protect a person who was allegedly denied his
first amendment right of freedom of association by a purely private
conspiracy. The Fourth Circuit avoided the first of these questions,
failing to consider whether section 1985(3) would cover the non-racial
discrimination alleged in Bellamy; and, although implying that section 5
authorized Congress to protect fourteenth-amendment-based rights7
from private action,8 the court held that section 1985(3) displayed
congressional intent that state action be required for an action based on
a conspiracy to deprive first amendment rights.9
The suit arose after John Bellamy was fired from his position at
Mason's, allegedly because of -his membership in the Ku Klux Klan.
Bellamy sued his former employer under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. sections
2000e-2 and 1985(3) for violating his right of free association.' 0 The
district court 1 dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim for
which relief could be granted under either statute,'" and Bellamy ap-
pealed. The court of appeals summarily affirmed the district court's
holding as to section 2000e-2' 3 and addressed whether section 1985(3)
protects an individual's first amendment rights from private conspira-
cies. The court held that section 1985(3) was applicable only when
first amendment rights were violated as a result of state action. The
court reasoned that the right of association is a first amendment right
that is only protected from §tate action because of incorporation into the
6. 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974).
7. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article." Id. § 5. The first amendment right of freedom of association is
incorporated into section 1 of the fourteenth amendment. NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958).
8. For the majority's treatment of this issue, see note 42 and text accompanying
notes 40-42 infra. In his concurring opinion, Judge Boreman states that Congress does
not have the power under section 5 to reach private action. 508 F.2d at 508.
9. 508 F.2d at 506-07.
10. Id. at 505.
11. Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Va. 1973).
12. Id. at 1026, 1029.
13. Section 2000e-2 is the modem statute proscribing employment discrimination
based on race, color, national origin, sex, and religion. Bellamy alleged that the Ku
Klux Klan was a religion "because its meetings were full of 'religious pomp and
ceremony.'" 508 F.2d at 505. However, due to a failure to comply with pleading rules,
this interesting proposition was not properly before the court. Id.
[Vol. 54
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
fourteenth amendment and that the language of section 1985(3) paral-
lels the language of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment which
requires state action;14 therefore, it concluded that although Congress
may have the power to reach a private conspiracy denying first amend-
ment rights, section 1985(3) is not a reflection of that power. 5
To consider the Bellamy decision in the proper perspective, a
detailed examination of Griffin v. Breckenridge and subsequent lower
court decisions is in order. Griffin concerned several black plaintiffs
who were physically assaulted after the passage of their car on a public
road was blocked by white defendants. The rights allegedly violated
included the first amendment rights of freedom of speech, association
and assembly. 16 The first issue the Supreme Court addressed was
whether section 1985(3) applied to private conspiracies. The Court
cited three reasons for answering this issue in the affirmative. First, the
language of section 1985(3) indicated congressional intent to reach
private parties. The Court focused on the words "go in disguise" and
noted that such activity was little associated with official action, yet
commonly connected with private marauders. 7  Second, Congress en-
compassed all types of state action in three companion provisions to
section 1985(3). The three possible forms of state action are: (1)
under color of state law, covered by the present 42 U.S.C. section 1983;
(2) interference with or influence upon state authorities, covered by
another clause of section 1985(3); and (3) a private conspiracy so
massive and effective that it supplants state authorities, covered by
section 3 of the Ku Klux Klan Act. In view of these three provisions,
the Court reasoned that section 1985(3) would be a useless duplication
unless it applied to private action.' 8 Third, the legislative history
indicated that the sponsors of section 1985(3) intended the statute to
cover private acts. The Court noted that speeches of several supporters
of original section 1985(3) stressed the need to reach private action.' 9
After determining that section 1985(3) applied to private conspir-
acies, the Griffin Court considered the requirements for the application
14. Id. at 506-07. For a fuller discussion of this aspect of the court's rationale, see
notes 40-43 and accompanying text infra.
15. 508 F.2d at 508 (Boreman, CJ., concurring).
16. 403 U.S. at 9-91.
17. Id. at 96.
18. Id. at 98-99. "Given the existence of these three provisions, it is almost
impossible to believe that Congress intended, in the dissimilar language of the portion of
§ 1985(3) now before us, simply to duplicate the coverage of one or more of them." Id.
at 99.
19. Id. at 100-01.
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of the statute. The Court first construed section 1985(3) as requiring
some "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discrimina-
tory animus."20 The Court saw this requisite as necessary to promote
the policy of giving a civil rights statute "'a sweep as broad as [its]
language' ",21 without transforming it into a general federal tort stat-
ute.22 The Court's failure to specify the scope of this criterion raises the
question what type of discrimination other than racial discrimination is
covered by section 1985(3).
The second requirement the Court imposed was the identification
of some "source of congressional power to reach the private conspiracy
alleged by the complaint in [each] case. '28  The Court found section 2
of the thirteenth amendment and the right of interstate travel to be the
sources of congressional power to reach the private conspiracy alleged in
Griffin.24 However, the Court specified that
[i]n identifying these two constitutional sources of congres-
sional power, we do not imply the absence of any other. More
specifically, the allegations of the complaint in this case have not
required consideration of the scope of the power of Congress
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. By the same token,
since the allegations of -the complaint bring this cause of action
so close to the constitutionally authorized core of the statute,
there has been no occasion here to trace out its constitutionally
permissible periphery.25
The Court's failure to "trace out the constitutionally permissible peri-
phery" of the provision raises the question of the extent of congressional
authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Not surprising-
ly, lower court opinions since Griffin have grappled confusedly with the
scope of the Griffin criteria.
Most lower court decisions since Griffin have treated the "racial, or
otherwise class-based, animus" as the initial element of a 1985(3)
claim. Therefore, unless this threshold test is met, courts have been
able to side-step the question of the extent of congressional power under
20. Id. at 102. The statutory basis for the Court's construction of section 1985(3)
lies in the statute's language which parallels language of the fourteenth amendment. See
notes 1 and 7 supra for the relevant language. The Court determined that instead of
being merely a reference to the fourteenth amendment, the word "equal" was used to
indicate the need of "class" discrimination. Id. at 102. See Note, 1972 U. ILL. LF.
supra note 3, at 205.
21. 403 U.S. at 97.
22. Id. at 101-02.
23. Id. at 104.
24. Id. at 105.
25. Id. at 107 (footnote omitted).
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section 5. In cases which do not involve state action, some courts have
construed the term "class-based discrimination" very narrowly, thereby
avoiding the issue whether section 5 authorizes Congress to reach
purely private activity.2 6 On the other hand, those courts not faced with
the section 5 issue, either due to the presence of state action in the claim
alleged or due to the court's previous determination that state action is
required, tend to interpret "class" very broadly. 7 In other words, most
courts have avoided answering one question by a limiting construction
of the other issue. As a result, the success of a 1985(3) cause of action
absent state action has remained doubtful. However, two courts have
found a cause of action under section 1985(3) in the absence of both
state action and racial discrimination.
The Eighth Circuit in Action v. Gannon28 held that a private
conspiracy to deprive certain church members of first amendment rights
mainly on the basis of their economic class was covered by seotion
1985(3).29 The Eighth Circuit first found constitutional authority
under section 5 by relying on the sentiments of six Supreme Court
Justices expressed in two concurring opinions in United States v.
Guest.3" Guest concerned the criminal counterpart of section
1985(3). 3' In his concurring opinion in that case, Justice Clark
summed up the opinion of the six Justices very succinctly: "[T]here now
can be no doubt that the specific language of § 5 empowers the
Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without state
action-that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights."'32  The
26. Arnold v. Tiffany, 359 F. Supp. 1034, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (newspaper
dealers trade association-no class); America's Best Cinema Corp. v. Fort Wayne
Newspapers, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 328, 335 (N.D. Ind. 1972) (all theaters showing unrated
adult movies-no class). See Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination:
The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74
COLUM. L. RPv. 449, 517 (1974).
27. Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1973) (suppo)rters of political
candidate); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 193 (7th Cir. 1972) (criminal
lawyers, case dismissed due to absence of state action); Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382,
1386 n.5 (6th Cir. -1972) (middle class white family).
28. 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc).
29. Id. at 1232. Although racial implications were present, the court recognized
that the primary motivation was based on economic class considerations.
30. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970).
32. 383 U.S. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring) (emphasis added). See also id. at 774
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, one writer notes that
only two of the six Guest Justices who adhered to the quoted view remain on the Court
and that subsequent lower court cases treat the concurring opinions as dicta. Comment,
Civil Rights-Section 1985(3)-Civil Remedy Provided to Redress Interference with
First Amendment Right of Religious Freedom by Private Conspiracy-Action v.
Gannon, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 584, 587 n.25 (1972).
1976]
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second basis of the Eighth Circuit's finding of constitutional authority
was the intent of the legislature that passed the fourteenth amendment.8 3
After examining the legislative history, the Action court concurred with
the opinion that "'[a]ccording to the purpose and intention of the
Amendment as disclosed in the debates in Congress and in the several
state Legislatures and in other ways, Congress had the constitutional
power to enact direct legislation to secure the rights of citizens against
violation by individuals as well as by States.' ,4
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit in Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co."
held that a private conspiracy to deny an environmentalist and tax
reformer his first amendment right of freedom of speech was reached by
section 1985(3). Although this opinion has since been withdrawn 8--
the matter giving rise to the action being moot-and therefore has no
precedential value, the court's analysis reflects valid considerations. In
addition to the reasons given by the Action court, the Fifth Circuit
based its finding of section 5 congressional power on the fact that the
state action requirement has become so watered down 7 that many state
action cases are indistinguishable from private action cases. 88
Despite the recent varied judicial interpretations of section
1985(3), two aspects of the Fourth Circuit's holding in Bellamy v.
Mason's Stores, Inc. are unique. First, the court did not discuss, or
even recognize, the issue whether discrimination on the basis of mem-
bership in the Ku Klux Klan would satisfy Griffin's "otherwise class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus." The court's failure to con-
33. 450 F.2d at 1236. See Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964). The author cites two
reasons to support his thesis that Congress does have the power to reach private acts
under section 5. First, the situation the fourteenth amendment was designed to remedy
required action against private wrongs. Id. at 1354. Second, "the framers wrote in light
of apparently settled constitutional doctrine that the mere recognition of a right in the
federal constitution gives Congress implied power to protect it" from private acts, and
thus section 5 was intended to broaden congressional power rather than limit it. Id. at
1357. But see Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on State
Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. Louis U.L.. 331 (1967).
34. 450 F.2d at 1237, quoting H. FLAcE, THE ADoPnON OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 277 (1909).
35. 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir.), vacated, 507 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
36. 507 F.2d at 216.
37. "A constitutional distinction cannot reasonably rest on the mere presense (sic]
or absence of a non-injuring state representative if we are to retain the amendment's
focus of protection of the victim." 507 F.2d at 214. For a brief summary of the
broadening of the "state action" requirement, see Note, Constitutional Law-Thirteenth
Amendment-Federal Civil Remedy Encompassing Private Conduct in Civil Rights
Violence, 46 TUL. L. REv. 822, 824-27 (1972).
38. 507F.2d at 211.
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sider this issue is inconsistent with section 1985(3) litigation since
Griffin, which has generally considered establishment of a class as a
threshold for the application of the statute.3 9
Additionally, although recent case law indicates that a major prob-
lem in applying section 1985(3) to private conspiracies is finding
constitutional authority for such action, the Bellamy court assumed that
constitutional authority existed.40  The Fourth Circiit's major concern
was determining whether Congesss intended section 1985(3) to protect
first amendment rights. One rationale the court gave for refusing to
apply section 1985(3) to first amendment rights concerned the fact that
the language of the statute parallels the language of section 1 of the
fourteenth amendment.41 The court relied on United States v. Guest
for the proposition that no equal protection clause rights exist against
purely private action. 2 However, the Supreme Court specifically recog-
nized in Griffin that although a century of fourteenth amendment
adjudication construing the equal protection clause makes "it under-
standably difficult to conceive of what might constitute a deprivation of
the equal protection of the laws by private persons,. . . there is nothing
inherent in the phrase that requires the action working the deprivation
to come from the State."43 In light of the facts that Griffin was decided
five years after Guest, and that Griffin dealt with section 1985(3) while
Guest dealt with that section's criminal counterpart, the Bellamy court's
reliance on Guest seems misplaced.
A second rationale is exhibited in the court's refusal to follow the
Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Action v. Gannon as to application of
section 1985(3) to first amendment rights.4 This refusal followed
from the Fourth Circuit's belief -that the Supreme Court must extend the
incorporation doctrine to private persons before the statute can be
construed to protect first amendment rights. Although the court found
39. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text supra.
40. See note 8 supra.
41. For the comparative language, see notes 1 & 7 supra.
42. 508 F.2d at 507. Actually, this statement was an allegation of the defense. 383
U.S. at 754. Since the Court found allegations of state action, Justice Stewart's
agreement with the allegation was not necessary to the Court's holding. However, six
Justices in concurring opinions suggest that they were not in agreement as to the
allegation. Nonetheless, many lower courts have treated the statemen't as part of the
holding. See note 32 supra.
43. 403 U.S. at 97.
44. The Fourth Circuit sums up Action's reasoning as going "from statutory
language tracking the fourteenth amendment to the amendment itself to incorporation of
the first amendment to application of that amendment to private persons, and jettisoning
state involvement." 508 F.2d at 507.
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the Action result appealing, it felt that the right of association was too
far removed from the language of section 1985(3) for Congress to have
intended its protection in that provision. However, again the court's
position seems inconsistent with Griffin. The court misconstrued Grif-
fin by confusing "source of constitutional authority" with "source of
rights deprived." This confusion is illustrated by the court's citation of
Griffin for the idea that section 1985(3) includes rights based upon the
thirteenth amendment.45 However, none of the rights allegedly denied
in Griffin was based on the thirteenth amendment; in fact, several,
including the right of freedom of association, were based on the first
amendment.46 Rather than being -the source of the deprived rights, the
thirteenth amendment was the source of constitutional authority for
applying the statute in Griffin, since the requisite animus was based on
race.
Although the Bellamy case was ideally suited for further definition
of the Griffin criteria, the Fourth Circuit failed to take advantage of the
opportunity. Based on the district court's finding that the Ku Klux
Klan is a political organization,47 indications are that membership in the
Ku Klux Klan would be considered a sufficient class for section
1985(3) purposes. The Supreme Court has held that interference with
the right of association for political groups also interferes with the right
to vote.48 In addition, discrimination on the basis of political associa-
tion indicates a purpose to deny that particular group equal participation
in the political process. The federal interest in protecting the right to
vote and other political rights justifies considering discrimination on the
basis of political association as satisfying the "otherwise class-based dis-
criminatory animus." 49
Indications are also good that the Supreme Court would uphold
section 5 power to reach private action. As the Action court noted,
although the Supreme Court left open the question of section 5 powers
in Griffin, the fourteenth amendment and section 1985(3) are too
closely related with respect to date of passage, authorship, and purpose
to permit the Supreme Court to deny section 5 power to reach private
action with consistency.50 The similarity in language between section
45. Id. at 506.
46. 403 U.S. at 101.
47. 368 F. Supp. at 1028.
48. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
49. Note, Federal Remedy to Redress Private Deprivations of Civil Rights, 85
HARv. L. R V. 95, 100 (1971).
50. 450 F.2d at 1236.
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1985(3) and section 1 of the fourteenth amendment must be of some
significance and gives credence to the argument that Congress intended
section 1985(3) to protect fourteenth-amendment-based rights against
private interference.
Besides the court's failure to deal with the scope of Griffin's
criteria, the Bellamy decision has other shortcomings. The Fourth
Circuit virtually ignored the Griffin framework of section 1985(3)
interpretation, while relying on older and less relevant cases. The court
did not consider whether the requisite class discrimination was satisfied.
Nor was Griffin's policy of giving civil rights statutes a broad interpreta-
tion considered or followed. Finally, the minimum consideration given
Griffin was based on a misinterpretation of the Supreme Courts holding
in that case. Although section 1985(3) has made great strides since
1971 towards becoming a vital civil rights statute, the Bellamy decision
indicates that, at least until the Supreme Court clearly defines the scope
of the statute, application of section 1985(3) will be greatly restricted.
SUSAN C. MALPASS
Constitutional Law-State Action-Golden v. Biscayne Bay
Yacht Club: Preventing Discrimination by Private Clubs
Using the bay bottom off Miami as a vantage point, the Fifth
Circuit has launched a state action torpedo to sink the membership
practices of a private yacht club. Although the Supreme Court has
refrained from answering whether the membership policies of private
clubs can be attacked on state action grounds,' the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit found the question squarely presented to it in Golden v.
Biscayne Bay Yacht Club2 and answered the question in the affirmative.
In Golden the court held that leasing publicly owned bay bottom land to
a yacht club for its docks constituted sufficient state involvement to
unleash a fourteenth amendment attack on racial and religious discrimi-
nation in the club's membership practices.3
1. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-68 (1972), the Supreme
Court refused on standing grounds to hear an attack on allegedly discriminatory
membership practices of a private social club.
2. 521 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1975).
3. Id. at 352 (alternative holding).
19761
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The Biscayne Bay Yacht Club (hereinafter referred to as the
Club) is a private social club with waterfront and dock facilities on
Biscayne Bay, Florida.' The Club had utilized these facilities for thirty
years when in 1962 the City of Miami asserted title to the bay bottom
under the Club's docks. Since 1962 the Club has leased the bay
bottom from the city for one dollar per year. The most recent lease
included provisions prohibiting the Club from discriminating on the
basis of race, religion or national origin against persons desiring access
to the leased facilities and from requiring applicants for membership
to be sponsored as a condition for consideration.7 Despite this anti-
discrimination proviso in the lease, membership in the Club has been
by sponsorship and upon approval of the Club's Board of Governors
by use of a three-vote veto system.'
Two plaintiffs, a black and a Jew, separately sought and were de-
nied membership applications because of the sponsorship requirement.9
Plaintiffs, alleging that the Club's membership policies were discrimina-
tory, subsequently sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the
Club, the City of Miami and its mayor and commissioners under 42
U.S.C. sections 1981 and 1983 and Title II ° of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.11 The district court, finding that the sponsorship policy discrimi-
nated against black and Jewish applicants and that the lease provided
sufficient state involvement to meet the fourteenth amendment state
action requirement enjoined the Club under section 1983 from denying
membership to persons solely on grounds of race or religious affilia-
tion.'12
On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals' 3 for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed. The court agreed with the district court that the sponsorship
policy, in light of the fact that there had been no black or Jewish
members since the Club's inception, 14 operated in practice to exclude
4. Id. at 347.
5. Id.
6. Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 370 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
7. Id. at 104041. The provisions were pursuant to two City of Miami ordi-
nances. Id.
8. 521 F.2d at 347.
9. 370 F. Supp. at 1041.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. (1970).
11. 370 F. Supp. at 104041.
12. Id. at 1042-44.
13. The court of appeals split 2-1. Chief Judge Brown wrote for the majority;
Judge Coleman dissented.
14. The Commodore of the Jamaica Yacht Club, a black, was an honorary
member. 521 F.2d at 347.
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blacks and Jews. 15
The majority devoted the bulk of its opinion to a determination of
whether sufficient connection existed between the Club and the City of
Miami to satisfy the "color of law" state action prerequisite 6 for relief
under section 1983.17 Noting that the Supreme Court has required that
this examination be conducted by "sifting facts and weighing circum-
stances' 8  on a case-by-case basis, the court studied the similarities
between the facts of the instant case and other cases involving discrimi-
nation by private individuals. 19 The court determined that there was
sufficient state involvement present in Golden to constitute state action
on either of two grounds. First, the court held that the leasing of
publicly owned property ipso facto established a sufficient nexus be-
tween private and public conduct for a finding of state action when the
15. Id. at 348-49. In 1970, Dade County (in which the Club is located) had a
combined black and Jewish population of thirty percent 370 F. Supp. at 1043. The
court also noted that the district judge could have found that racial and religious
discrimination resulted from the Club's use of a three-vote veto. 521 F.2d at 349 n.10.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides for a civil action for "deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and the laws" by any person
acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State
.... ." Section 1983's "color of law" requirement is generally equated with the state
action concept of the fourteenth amendment. Originally, there was a controversy over
whether a cause of action could lie under section 1983 against anyone other than a state
official acting pursuant to state law. A landmark case, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961), settled the issue in favor of a broader reading of the statute. Subsequent cases
have equated section 1983's "color of law" concept to the fourteenth amendment state
action concept. Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107, 1110 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1039 (1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 741 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1009 (1974); Green v. Dumke, 480 F.2d 624, 628 (9th Cir. 1973); see, e.g.,
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
17. See 521 F.2d at 349-53. The majority deemed "it unnecessary to reach the
question whether the Club's admission policies also violated § 1981 and Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a." 521 F.2d at 348.
The Biscayne Bay Yacht Club would probably qualify for the private club exemp-
tion from Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970).
The only Supreme Court case interpreting the scope of this exemption, Daniel v. Paul,
395 U.S. 298 (1969), laid out three criteria that must be satisfied to gain -the exemption:
1) a non-business character, 2) membership control over club finances and governance,
and 3) genuine selectivity over admissions. Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private
Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era
Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. Rav. 449, 492 (1974). The Biscayne Bay Yacht Club
would easily satisfy these requirements. See 370 F. Supp. at 1040-41.
The question of the applicability of section 1981 to private clubs may be illuminated
by a case pending in the Supreme Court, Runyon v. McCrary, 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D.
Va. 1973), modified, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S.
Nov. 11, 1975) (No. 62). For a discussion of section 1981's applicablility to private
clubs, see Note, 74 CoLtrm. L. REv., supra, at 494-95.
18. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
19. See 521 F.2d at 349-53.
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private entity practiced racial discrimination.2" Second, in a somewhat
confusing discussion of the facts in Golden, the court seemed to find
that the Club and the city were engaged in a mutually beneficial joint
venture.21 To establish this symbiotic relationship the court pointed to
the consensual nature of the lease between the city and the Club, to the
benefits provided to the city by the existence of private dock facilities
which relieved pressure on crowded public dock facilities, and to the
benefits that the lease afforded the Club through making possible docks
which were essential to the Club's existence and by providing financial
assistance through the token rental fee.2 2
Since the Nineteenth Century Civil Rights Cases,28 the fourteenth
amendment has protected citizens from the denial by states of due
process or the equal protection of the law but has erected "no shield
against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful."24
In spite of this limitation the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts have constructed three main theories to find the state action
needed to reach and proscribe some types of private discrimination. Two
of these theories-the public function theory, designed to reach private
conduct that has taken on the character of governmental activity, 25 and
the state encouragement or authorization theory, designed to reach
private action taken pursuant to government encouragement or authori-
zation 26-- are not apposite in GoldenY'
20. See id. at 352.
21. See id. at 351-52.
22. See id.
23. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
24. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (footnote omitted).
25. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946).
26. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 267 (1963).
27. The public function theory would be applicable in Golden only if providing
dock facilities could be characterized as a governmental function. This characterization
would be problematic here because private conduct has been found to constitute state
action under the public function theory generally when the public entities are the sole
and usual providers of the particular service. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 300-
02 (1966). For a full discussion of what constitutes state action under this theory, see
Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private
Activity, 74 CoLrJm. L. RFv. 656, 690-98 (1974).
The state encouragement theory would probably not be applicable in Golden
because, far from encouraging private discrimination, the City of Miami attempted to
prevent it by including in the lease the anti-discrimination provisions mentioned in the
text accompanying note 7 supra. Any attempt to find state authorization in Golden on
the theory that the city's acquiescence in the discriminatory conduct implied state
authorization would be precluded by the plaintiffs' failure to show that city officials had
knowledge of the Club's discriminatory practices. See 370 F. Supp. at 1044. But see
text accompanying notes 52-54 infra.
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The third theory-the state involvement or "nexus!' theory-which
is at issue in the principal case, had its first full statement in Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority,28 in which the Supreme Court held that
the proscriptions of the fourteenth amendment ran against a lessee of
public property when the lessee and the state were engaged in a mutual-
ly beneficial venture.2 9  Various factors established the symbiotic rela-
tionship in Burton: the operation of the lessee's restaurant within a
public parking garage that provided the restaurant with additional
demand for its services and with convenient parking facilities for its
patrons, and the state's dependence for financing its garage on the rental
receipts from its commercial lessees in the building. 0
Using the state involvement theory, lower federal courts have fre-
quently found that leases of public property, when accompanied by
other ties between the state and the private activity, establish the req-
uisite nexus between the state and the challenged private conduct.
These cases typically have involved situations in which the state has at-
tempted through a lease to exercise some control over the lessee's con-
duct or to secure additional benefits for the state. 1 Leases have not
been sufficient to constitute state action in a few cases in which the
alleged constitutional violation did not involve racial discrimination 2 or
28. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
29. See id. at 724-26.
30. See id. at 724.
31. See Wimbish v. Pinellas County, 342 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1965) (lessee barred
from discriminating against blacks where lease of county land required lessee to build a
golf course subject to county's approval of plans, gave county powers designed to keep
golf course open to general public, and vested title to all improvements in county);
Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957)
(lessee of courthouse basement barred from denying cafeteria service to blacks where
express purpose of lease was to furnish cafeteria service for benefit of persons frequent-
ing courthouse). But cf. Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962) (barring racially segregated operation of private golf
courses where owner purchased the courses from city and where the land would revert to
the city should the land fail to be used as golf courses); Jones v. Marva Theatres, Inc.,
180 F. Supp. 49 (D. Md. 1960) (lessee barred from continuing segregated seating
arrangements where lease of theatre located in city hall granted city right to use the
premises four days per year).
32. See Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 433 (1975) (White, J., and Burger, C.J., dissenting) (allow-
ing private hospital to refuse to permit physician to perform elective abortions where
county built and leased hospital to defendant for nominal consideration but had no
control over hospital policies). Contra, O'Neill v. Grayson County War Memorial
Hosp., 472 F.2d 1140 (6th Cir. 1973) (reversing dismissal of section 1983 claim against
private hospital which refused to permit plaintiff doctor to practice there when hospital
leased from county for nominal consideration under contract that required specified
number of official members on defendant's board of directors).
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in which a lease had little or no connection with the challenged prac-
tice.33
Two recent Supreme Court decisions, Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis3 4 and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,-" which refused to find
state action, restricted the use of the state involvement theory enunciated
in Burton.8 Although the facts of both of these non-lease cases could
easily have been the basis for finding a Burton mutually beneficial
relationship, the Supreme Court required that the state be directly
involved in the challenged private conduct when the challenged action is
initiated by the private entity and not the state."' This new requirement
retreats significantly from the view implicit in Burton that the state
becomes inextricably involved in a private party's discriminatory prac-
tices whenever the state and the private individual have formed a
mutually beneficial relationship.38
At a time when the Supreme Court is restricting 9 the use of the
state action concept, the Fifth Circuit in Golden is increasing its scope.
The court's holding that a lease of public property ipso facto establishes
state involvement when the lessee practices racial discrimination is a
significant departure from earlier state action cases involving leases. In
Burton the Supreme Court expressly noted that not all leases of public
property would constitute state action.40 Indeed, the great pains taken
in Burton41 and other lease cases 42 to establish additional links between
the state and private defendants accused of racial discrimination would
have been needless if a lease itself could have sufficed to constitute state
action. One Fifth Circuit lease case, Wimbish v. Pinellas County,8
33. See Solomon v. Miami Woman's Club, 359 F. Supp. 41 (S.D. Fla. 1973)(dismissing suit by blacks to enjoin allegedly discriminatory membership practices of
private clubs and federation where federation leased land for its state headquarters from
a municipality for nominal consideration under a contract requiring lessee to build office
which would revert to city and to pay taxes on building).
34. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
35. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
36. Note, Termination of Electrical Service Does Not Constitute State Action lor
Purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 EmORY L.J. 510, 525 (1975); Note, Public
Utilities-State Action and Informal Due Process After Jackson, 53 N.C.L. REv. 817,
823-24 (1975); see Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REV. 840, 847
(1974).
37. See 419 U.S. at 351, 358; 407 U.S. at 176-77; Note, 60 VA. L. Rav., supra note
36, at 849-50.
38. See generally Note, 24 EMoRY LJ., supra note 36, at 529.
39. See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
40. 365 U.S. at 725-26.
41. See id. at 722-25.
42. Cases cited note 31 supra.
43. 342 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1965).
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which the court in Golden cited,44 supports this reading of Burton. In
that case the Fifth Circuit explicitly relied on the lease's additional
provisions to tie the state to the private endeavor.45
In holding that an unadorned lease could constitute state action,
the court in Golden appears to have ignored the Moose Lodge-Jackson
requirement that the state be directly involved in the private conduct
that is being challenged. The Golden majority held that Moose Lodge
was not controlling because that case involved a license instead of a
lease.46 This attempt at distinguishing Golden from Moose Lodge was
much too simplistic since the rationale of the Moose Lodge and Jackson
holdings does not appear to be limited to licensing situations. Applied
in a leasing situation, the Moose Lodge-Jackson requirement would
dictate that the state be directly involved in its lessee's discriminatory
conduct.
The Fifth Circuit in Golden was not compelled to hold that a lease
when coupled with racially disciminatory practices constituted sufficient
state involvement in order to enjoin those practices under section 1983.
The court could have employed the fuller Burton analysis as modified
by Moose Lodge and Jackson to find state action in this case.
Golden's facts would clearly seem to fulfill the state involvement
theory's basic requirement of a mutually beneficial relationship. The
lease of the bay bottom land provided the Club with docks essential to
its existence and with financial subsidization through the token rental
fee. 7 These benefits seem more important to the Club in Golden than
the convenient parking and increased patronage 8 that the lease in
Burton provided the Eagle Restaurant. The lease in Golden also bene-
fitted the City of Miami since the existence of private dock facilities
relieved the city from having to provide more public dock facilities.49
The benefits to the City of Miami seem at least as important as the
benefits5" provided the state in Burton where the receipts from the lease
helped defray the cost of providing parking facilities for the public. In
addition, other state involvement lease cases have found state action
44. 521 F.2d at 352.
45. 342 F.2d at 805-06. The Wimbish lease contained provisions that gave the
county effective control over plans for construction of a golf course which was closed to
blacks, control over membership and greens fees, and title to all improvements. Id.
46. 521 F.2d at 353.
47. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
48. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
49. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
50. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
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when the primary benefit to the public entities came from the private
provision of recreational facilities open to their citizens.,"
Not only do the facts in Golden satisfy Burton but they also meet
the Moose Lodge-Jackson requirement. The city is directly implicated
in the Club's discriminatory membership practices in two ways. First,
the city's failure to enforce the anti-discrimination provisions 2 in its
lease represents, at a minimum, an acquiescence in the Club's discrimi-
natory practices. 53 More importantly, any time a state provides a scarce
public resource for the exclusive use of a private club that has discrimi-
natory membership practices, the state effectively allocates the public
resource in a discriminatory manner.54
Although Golden's holding appears to be a sweeping one, the Fifth
Circuit expressly restricted the applicability of its finding of state action
to situations in which racial or religious discrimination is present." The
court was compelled to do this because of its inability to distinguish an
earlier Fifth Circuit case56 which did not involve racial discrimination
and in which the leasing of a publicly owned facility to be operated as a
private hospital was held not to constitute state action. The rationale the
51. See cases cited in note 31 supra.
52. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
53. But cf. note 27 supra.
54. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Coleman argued that since the city does not
exercise any control over the Club's internal matters, the case does not satisfy the
requisite connection that Moose Lodge and Jackson demand and argued that the decision
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York Jaycees, Inc. v. United
States Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975), should be followed. In that case, the Second
Circuit held that federal funding of public service projects was not a sufficient nexus to
attack discriminatory membership policies when non-members were the beneficiaries of
the projects. New York Jaycees is inapposite to Golden because the members in Golden
are the exclusive beneficiaries of the dock facilities and the financial subsidization that
flow from the lease of public land.
It is possible to argue that Moose Lodge implicitly rejected the argument contained
in the text because no state action was found to inhere when members of the lodge
received the benefits that stemmed from a liquor license. On the other hand, Moose
Lodge is distinguishable from Golden because in Moose Lodge there was no finding that
the liquor license was essential to the lodge's existence and the Court used standing
grounds to turn back the attack on the discriminatory membership practices. See 407
U.S. at 164-79. Moose Lodge is a perplexing case because the indicia of state action
which the decisionj lays out could be satisfied on the case's facts. See The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. Rnv. 50, 73 (1972).
55. See 521 F.2d at 350-53. Although the cases the majority cited to justify its
position all involve racial discrimination, -the majority equates religious discrimination to
racial discrimination because it "carries the same stigma of inferiority and badge of
opprobrium. ... ." Id. at 351.
56. Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 433 (1975) (White, J., and Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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court gave for attacking racially motivated constitutional violations more
vigorously than other violations was that such denials "precipitated
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 57 Whatever the original
impetus behind the fourteenth amendment's enactment, its protection
has been extended to all citizens. If other challenged private actions are
constitutional violations, there would seem to be no reason to permit
them to go unredressed unless there are countervailing policy reasons.
The Golden court failed to mention any.58
While lower federal courts have split over whether a lesser degree
of state involvement is required to proscribe private racial discrimination
than to proscribe other constitutional violations,59 the Supreme Court
has not expressly embraced either view.60 The Golden majority, citing
the results of a number of Supreme Court cases, attributed to the Court
an unwillingness to condone any degree of state involvement in cases
involving racially discriminatory conduct. 61  The Fifth Circuit, how-
ever, ignored the Supreme Court case most directly on point with
Golden-Moose Lodge-in which the high Court upheld a private
club's right to refuse to serve a black guest.6" In that case the Supreme
Court seemed to give greater weight to the associational rights of the
private defendant than to the black plaintiffs interests.6" Although the
Court rested its holding on the lack of direct state involvement in the
discriminatory conduct, commentators have suggested that the high
Court must have been influenced by the defendant's associational rights
57. 521 F.2d at 351.
58. The Golden court implied that there might be countervailing policy reasons.
See id. at 350 n.12. The majority cited Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513
F.2d 873, 879 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 433 (1975), to the effect that
the "potentially explosive impact of the application of state action concepts de-
signed to ferret out racially discriminatory policies in areas unaffected by racial
considerations has led courts to define more precisely the applicability of the state action
doctrine." 521 F.2d at 350 n.12. The Golden court, however, excluded the most likely
countervailing reason: the Club's associational rights. See text accompanying note 70
infra.
59. See Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 433 (1975); Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d
Cir. 1974); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Powe
v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); cf. Chiaffitelli v. Dettmer Hosp., Inc., 437
F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Meredith v. Allen County War Memorial Hosp.
Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968). Contra, O'Neill v. Grayson County War
Memorial Hosp., 472 F.2d 1140, 1143-44 n.3 (6th Cir. 1973).
60. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 373-74 (1974) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
61. 521 F.2d at 350, 351 n.14.
62. See 407 U.S. 163.
63. See id.
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because the other facts of the case are indistinguishable from earlier
cases finding state action. 64
The Supreme Court's handling of Moose Lodge and other recent
state action cases has suggested to commentators that the high Court is
actually employing a state action analysis that balances the rights of
plaintiffs against the competing interests of private defendants in decid-
ing whether there is state action.6 5 One commentator has argued that
such a covert balancing approach obscures the basic issues involved in
answering whether the fourteenth amendment should run against private
individuals in a given case. 66 He recommended using a two-stage
analysis which balances conflicting constitutional rights of the parties
after an initial determination that the state is involved in the challenged
conduct. 67  The Supreme Court has not expressly adopted such an
approach but instead has continued overtly to rest its decisions solely on
the failure to find a sufficient quantum of state involvement in the
private conduct.6
The high Court's failure to explain the considerations that lie at the
heart of its decisions, when added to the "sifting facts and weighing
circumstances" approach of the state action cases, permits haphazard
results as lower courts pick and choose among conflicting Supreme
Court opinions for guidance. 69 It also promotes haphazard considera-
tion of the competing policies at stake. For instance, the Fifth Circuit
in Golden, while emphasizing the invidious nature of racial discrimina-
tion, perfunctorily disposed of the Club's associational rights in a single
paragraph by asserting that the private exercise of freedom of associa-
tion deserves no consitutional protection when it involves state action.70
Yet this is in conflict with the weight seemingly given private associa-
tional rights in Moose Lodge in the face of charges of racial discrimina-
64. See Note, 60 VA. L. REv., supra note 36, at 849-50; cf. Note, 53 N.C.L.
REv., supra note 36, at 825-26.
65. Note, 53 N.C.L. REv., supra note 36, at 825; see Note, Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery: Is There More to Equal Protection Than State Action?, 53 N.C.L. REV.
545, 550 (1975); Note, 60 VA. L. REv., supra note 36, at 850.
66. Note, 53 N.C.L. REv., supra note 65.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 549-50.
69. See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REv. 49, 150 (1975).
70. 521 F.2d at 353. For a discussion of the absolutionist approach to association-
al freedom, see Note, 60 VA. L. REv., supra note 36, at 854-63. For an argument that a
rule of reason should be employed to balance the competing values, see Black, The
Supreme Court, 1966 Term, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and Califor-
na's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 101-03 (1967). For a discussion of how and
when the rights of private individuals should give way to constitutional proscriptions, see
Note, 74 CoLuM. L. REv., supra note 27.
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tion. While in Golden the rights of religious and racial minorities may
well outweigh the Club's associational rights, the case, as the firstf1
imposition of fourteenth amendment duties on what would traditionally
have been considered a private club, warrants a much fuller discussion
of the associational freedoms of the Club.
In sum, Golden's assault on the Club's membership practices was
misplaced because the Fifth Circuit refused to base its holding solely on
a Burton-Moose Lodge-Jackson state involvement analysis. Its reliance
on the lease as an adequate basis for finding state action seems to run
counter to the latest pronouncements on the issue by the Supreme Court.
The court's overly broad construction of state action was partly excusa-
ble because the Supreme Court has not articulated the relative import-
ance it attaches to the nature of the constitutional right asserted by
plaintiffs and the countervailing interests of private defendants. Unless
the high Court dispels the confusion that has arisen from its handling of
these cases, state action assaults on private discrimination will continue
to be hit-or-miss attacks.
MICHAEL W. PAmIcK
Criminal Procedure-Michigan v. Mosley: A New Constitutional
Procedure
In Miranda v. Arizona' the United States Supreme Court set out
specific guidelines, which, if not followed, required that statements ob-
tained through custodial interrogation not be used against the accused.'
71. This conclusion depends on which definition of private club is used. Using the
definition discussed at note 17 supra, Golden represents the first decision imposing
constitutional restrictions on membership in a private social club. See 521 F.2d at 353
(Coleman, J., dissenting). But cf. Goodloe v. Davis, 514 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1975).
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Briefly stated Miranda held:
the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege of self-incrim-
ination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law en-
forcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural
safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to
inform accused persons of their right to remain silent and to assure a continu-
ous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to
any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain si-
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Miranda embodied a decision3 that it was better for some guilty persons
to go free than to allow the police to engage in improper conduct.4 The
decision produced a strong adverse public reaction that has been partly
reflected5 in a series of decisions since 1971 that have expanded the
admissibility of custodially derived evidence.6 In Michigan v. Mosley7
the Court has again diminished the impact of Miranda by sanctioning
the renewed questioning of a suspect after an expressed desire to remain
silent. In doing so, the Court created a new constitutionally required
procedure-that the police must "scrupulously honor" the accused's
right to cut off questioning-but defined the procedure so vaguely that
it offers little guidance to lower courts or the police.
The defendant, Robert Mosley, was arrested pursuant to an anony-
mous tip implicating him in two recent robberies as well as a
robbery/murder that had occurred -three months previously. After
receiving his Miranda warnings from the arresting officer, Mosley said
that he did not want to answer "any questions about the robberies.""
Accordingly, that officer asked no more questions, and Mosley was
charged with the two recent robberies (but not with the robbery/mur-
der) and jailed. More than two hours later a different police officer
took Mosley to a different interrogation room and again informed him
of his rights. After Mosley waived his rights the officer proceeded to
question him about the murder, which had not been discussed at the
previous interrogation. Upon being confronted with an incriminating
statement of a confederate, Mosley confessed.9
The confession was admitted into evidence at Mosley's trial over
his objection that the second interrogation violated his constitutional
lent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him,
and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or ap-
pointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If however, he indi-
cates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult
an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the in-
dividual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be inter-
rogated, the police may not question him.
Id. at 444-45 (footnote omitted).
3. Among those reasons were the danger of false confession resulting from the
psychological pressures of custodial interrogation, id. at 447-48, and "the respect a
government-state or federal-must accord the dignity and integrity of its citizens." Id.
at 460.
4. Id. at 457.
5. Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027, 1039
(1974).
6. See text accompanying notes 32-36 infra.
7. 96 S. Ct. 321 (1975).




right against self-incrimination because his expressed desire to remain
silent was not honored.10 The conviction that resulted from his trial
was overturned by the Michigan Court of Appeals," holding that the
second interrogation was a per se violation of Miranda.12  The Michi-
gan Supreme Court refused further appeal,' 3 but the "United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 4
Justice Stewart, writing for five members of the Court,15 declared
the issue in the case to be whether the police conduct complained of
violated the Miranda guidelines so that Mosley's confession was inad-
missible at his trial.'6 Answering this question required interpretation
of the following passage from Miranda:
"Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear.
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interroga-
tion must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to ex-
ercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after
the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of
compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off
questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the
individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after
the privilege has been once invoked."'17
The Court rejected a reading of the passage that would result in
finding a per se violation of Miranda.' Instead, the Court adopted a
new rule that would exclude the use of custodially obtained statements if
the accused's right to cut off questioning, in light of all the circum-
10. Id. at 324.
11. People v. Mosley, 51 Mich. App. 105, 214 N.W.2d 564 (1974).
12. "Miranda cannot be circumvented by the simple expedient of shuttling a person
from one police officer to another for purposes of questioning and thus justifying
subsequent interrogations after an election to remain silent." Id. at 566.
13. People v. Mosley, 392 Mich. 764 (1974).
14. Michigan v. Mosley, 419 U.S. 1119 (1975).
15. The other four were Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun, Powell and
Rehnquist. Justice White filed a concurrence, see text accompanying notes 21-22 infra.
Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall joined, see text
accompanying notes 23 and 24 infra.
16. 96 S. Ct. at 324. The Court's formulation of the issue can be found in text
accompanying note 54 infra.
17. Id. at 325, quoting 384 U.S. at 473-74.
18. The Court noted that there were two literal interpretations of the passage that
"would lead to absurd and unintended results." The first would read the passage to
mean that once a person invoked his right, he could never again be questioned "by any
police officer at any time or place on any subject." The second would read it to require
only a momentary cessation and "permit a resumption of interrogation after a momen-
tary respite." 96 S. Ct. at 325.
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stances of the case, was not "scrupulously honored."'" Although the
Court did not attempt to define what "scrupulously honoring" an ac-
cused's right to cut off questioning means, the Court did hold that
Mosley's right was so honored, and that his confession was admissible.20
In reaching this conclusion the Court relied on the following facts of the
Mosley case: the amount of time separating the two interrogations, the
different subject matter discussed at each session, the absence of discern-
able police techniques designed to wear down the accused, the different
interrogators, and the ambiguous nature of Mosley's statement that he
did not wish to answer questions about the "robberies."'2' Thus the
Court announced a new procedure to protect the accused's right to
remain silent, but declined to define it specifically.
While Justice White, concurring in the result, and Justices Brennen
and Marshall, dissenting, agreed with the majority that Miranda did not
create a per se proscription of renewed questioning for an indefinite
period, 22 both the concurrence and the dissent objected to the "scrupu-
lously honored" procedure. Justice White deplored the possibility that
some "voluntary" statements could be excluded under the procedure,
and would re-adopt the pre-Miranda rule of admitting any statement
that in view of all the circumstances was found to be voluntary.s
Justices Brennan and Marshall, on the other hand, faulted the vagueness
of the new procedure and suggested instead that the Court adopt
19. Id. at 326. Although a violation of the "scrupulously honored" procedure
evidently would prevent the prosecution from using a statement so obtained to prove
Mosley's guilt, the State would still be able to use the statement for impeachment
purposes. See text accompanying notes 32-34 Infra.
20. 96 S. Ct. at 326, 328.
21. Id. at 326-27. See text accompanying notes 59-62 infra.
22. Id. at 328-30, 330-34. The Court's unanimous rejection of a per se proscrip-
tion of renewed questioning is in contrast to section 140.8(2)(d) of the ALI MODEL
CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Prop. Official Draft, Apr. 15, 1975), which
states: "No waiver shall be sought from an arrested person at any time after he has
indicated in any manner that he does not wish to be questioned or that he wishes to
consult counsel before submitting to questioning." In commenting on section
140.8 (2) (d), the Institute said:
As the investigation in the case develops, it may be quite natural for the police
to inquire of an arrested person whether he wished to change his mind and
make a statement or submit to questioning, and there may be cases where such
a change of mind can occur without any semblance of coercion. On the other
hand, even a seemingly voluntary waiver given after a person has once
indicated he does not wish to cooperate may be the product of subtle coer-
cion ....
Id. at 52.
23. 96 S. Ct. at 328-30. Justice White's test for admissibility would be virtually
identical to the pre-Miranda "totality of the circumstances" test for voluntariness and
admissibility. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963); Leyra v.
Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 (1954); Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 561 (1897).
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concrete, objective guidelines for the police to follow; if the guidelines
were ignored the statement taken upon requestioning would be exclud-
ed. 4 The dissent concluded that the "scupulously honored" procedure
"signals a rejection of Miranda's basic premise."25
The Miranda premise was that the combination of modem police
interrogation technique and a custodial setting,2 6 in which the accused
was cut off from familiar surroundings, produced an inherently coer-
cive27 effect such that the confession, although "voluntary" in traditional
terms,28 could not "truly be the product of his free choice."29  That
premise reflected the Court's judgment that the interest in the protection
of "precious Fifth Amendment rights ' 3 -not lessened because a confes-
sion was ostensibly voluntary-necessitated a presumption that a custo-
dial confession was the result of coercion unless the State could prove
that the confession resulted from an informed and intelligent waiver of
those rights."' To determine if those rights had been so waived, the
Court established concrete, objective guidelines which, if not followed,
required the exclusion of the accused's confession.32
The first indication that the Burger Court was inclined to broaden
the admissibility of "voluntary" statements taken in violation of Miranda
came in Harris v. New York.33 In that case the Court interpreted
Miranda to mean that a statement taken in violation of Miranda, if
trustworthy, could be used to impeach the accused if he chose to take
the stand. However, Harris continued to bar "the prosecution from
making its case" with a statement taken in violation of Miranda.34
The Harris theme was expanded in Oregon v. Hass.35 In that case
the Court allowed the use of a statement for impeachment purposes even
though it was taken in the absence of counsel after the accused ex-
pressed a desire to see an attorney. Thus, for impeachment purposes at
24. 96 S. Ct. at 332.
25. Id. at 333.
26. 384 U.S. at 449-54.
27. Id. at 458.
28. See note 22 supra.
29. 384 U.S. at 458.
30. Id. at 457.
31. Id. at 479.
32. See note 2 supra.
33. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
34. Id. at 224. "The impeachment process here undoubtedly provided valuable aid
to the jury in assessing petitioner's credibility, and the benefits of this process should not
be lost, in our view, because of the speculative possibility that impermissible police
conduct will be encouraged thereby." Id. at 225.
35. 95 S. Ct. 1215 (1975).
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least, the giving or not giving of Miranda warnings will not affect a
custodial confession.
The admissibility of custodial confessions was expanded further in
Lego v. Twomey.3" In that case the Court set the State's burden of
proof on the issue of the voluntariness of the accused's waiver of his
rights at the "preponderance of the evidence" level, rather than at the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" level.
But the decision that sheds the most light on the Burger Court's
attitude toward Miranda came in Michigan v. Tucker.37 In Tucker the
police failed to inform the accused that an attorney could be appointed
without cost to handle his case, and subsequently the accused made a
statement that led the police to a witness whose testimony implicated
Tucker in the crime. In declining to exclude this "fruit" of the state-
ment38 taken in violation of the Miranda guidelines, the Court used a
novel analytical framework to decide the case. 9
Before Tucker, the accused's fifth amendment right against com-
pulsory self-incrimination as such was considered violated unless the
Miranda guidelines, or some other set of procedures adequate to protect
the right, were followed. If such procedures were not followed, any
statement taken was automatically excluded. 40  The procedural rules set
out in Miranda were never deemed constitutionally protected 41 because
their violation was thought to violate the fifth amendment right itself: if
adequate procedures were not taken to inform the accused of his consti-
tutional rights, any statement was presumed to be taken in violation of
the right against compulsory self-incrimination. 42  However, Tucker
destroyed this identity by divorcing the right against compulsory self-
incrimination, as such, from the procedures that were taken to protect
36. 404U.S. 477 (1972).
37. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
38. A dog found at the scene of the crime (a rape) led the police to Tucker. The
police questioned Tucker about his activities on the night of the rape and he replied that
he had been with a man named Henderson. Henderson, however, gave the police
information that incriminated Tucker. Id. at 436-37.
39. "We will ... first consider whether the police conduct complained of directly
infringed upon respondent's right against compulsory self-incrimination or whether it
instead violated only the prophylactic rules developed to protect that right. We will then
consider whether the evidence derived from this interrogation must be excluded." Id. at
439.
40. See note 2 supra.
41. 384U.S.at467.
42. "The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with
respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing
methods of interrogation." Id. at 476.
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that right.41 If the right itself were violated, then the statement would
still be excluded. But if only the procedures were violated, under
Tucker, the question remained whether that violation should require
exclusion of evidence derived from the interrogation."
In applying this analysis to the facts in Tucker, the Court found
that the accused's right against compulsory self-incrimination was not
violated because the police conduct in the case did not include "the
historical practices at which the right . . .was aimed."4" Evidently,
such "historical practices" are the crude police techniques used in the
past to compel confessions, such as torture,46 starvation, 17 or lengthy
incommunicado interrogation. 48  Since these practices were not found
in Tucker, the accused's fifth amendment right was held not violated,
and the Court's next inquiry was whether to exclude the evidence
derived from an interrogation that violated only the Miranda guide-
lines.49 Because the reliability of the evidence involved in Tucker was
not at issue, and because the interrogation took place before Miranda
was decided-so that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule, the
deterrence of improper police conduct, would not be furthered-the
Court concluded that the violation of the Miranda guidelines in Tucker
should not trigger the exclusionary rule.50
Although the Court held that the police's pre-Miranda violation of
the Miranda procedure in Tucker would not trigger the exclusionary
rule, there was an implication in the case that a violation of a procedure
could trigger the exclusionary rule, even in a state proceeding." Exclu-
sion of evidence in a state proceeding, however, can be mandated by the
Supreme Court only in cases in which a constitutional right has been
43. See note 39 supra.
44. Id.
45. 417 U.S. at 444.
46. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
47. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
48. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
49. 417 U.S. at 446.
50. Id. at 450. As in Harris v. New York, note 32 and accompanying text supra,
the Tucker Court discounted or ignored the reasons set forth in Miranda, note 3 supra,
for the exclusionary rule and instead stressed deterrence as the main rationale for the
rule. In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974), the Court has developed
this to the point at which deterrence has become almost the sole justification for the rule.
And in Oregon v. Hass, note 34 and accompanying text supra, the Court refused to apply
the exclusionary rule even though without it the Court admitted the police would be
encouraged to act improperly. 95 S. Ct. at 1221.
51. "[1In deciding whether Henderson's testimony must be excluded, there is no
controlling . . . precedent to guide us." 417 U.S. at 446. By discussing whether
violation of the procedure should trigger the exclusionary rule, the Court is implying that
the violation could trigger the rule.
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violated.52 Thus, if the Supreme Court invokes the exclusionary rule in
a state court for the violation of a procedure designed to protect the
right against self-incrimination, it follows that the procedure must itself
be guaranteed by the Constitution. However, this conclusion is seem-
ingly contradicted by the Tucker holding that the Miranda guidelines
are "not themselves guaranteed by the Constitution."53  A possible
explanation of this apparent contradiction is that although the proce-
dures set forth in Miranda are not themselves constitutionally required,
there are some "constitutional" procedures, which if not followed, re-
quire the invocation of the exclusionary rule.
Michigan v. Mosley is the first case to identify such a "constitution-
al" procedure, although it did not do so explicitly. The elevation of a
procedure to a constitutional level in Mosley was accomplished through
the analysis set out in Tucker, although once again, this was not done
explicitly.
In Mosley the Court simply assumed, without discussion, that the
accused's right against compulsory self-incrimination was not violated.,4
Since Mosley did not assert that the police had employed "historical
practices" to obtain his confession, the Court evidently did not feel
constrained even to deliberate whether Mosley's confession was ob-
tained in violation of his fifth amendment right against compulsory self-
incrimination, as such.
Instead, the Court immediately launched into the next stage of the
Tucker analysis, "whether the conduct of the Detroit police that led to
Mosley's incriminating statement did in fact violate the Miranda 'guide-
lines' so as to render the statement inadmissible against Mosley at his
trial. 55 The Court went on to identify the procedure in question to be
whether the police "scrupulously honored" the accused's right to cut off
questioning.5"
By formulating the issue in Mosley as quoted above, the Court
appeared to be answering by negative implication the final stage of the
52. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 678 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943); United States v. Navarro, 441 F.2d 409, 411
(5th Cir. 1971); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HAmy. L. REv. 43, 201 (1974);
Note, Michigan v. Tucker: A Warning About Miranda, 17 Aiuz. L. REv. 188, 197
(1975).
53. 417 U.S. at 444.
54. This conclusion is based on the total absence of discussion of the issue of
voluntariness of Mosley's confession.
55. 96 S. Ct. at 324.
56. Id. at 326.
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Tucker analysis: 57 that if a violation of the "scrupulously honored"
procedure is found, exclusion will follow. The validity of this negative
implication is reinforced by the Court's holding: "We therefore conclude
that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody
has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his
'right to cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously honored.' ",58 Since
exclusion of evidence in a state court can only be triggered by a
constitutional violation, 59 it follows that the Court's new "scrupulously
honored" procedure is one guaranteed by the Constitution.
Although Mosley went beyond Miranda by creating a "constitu-
tional" procedure, it also disposed of the fundamental principle of
Miranda-that inherent coercion is always present in a custodial atmo-
sphere-by simply stating that the "scrupulously honored" procedure
"counteracts the coercive pressures of the custodial setting."6  As
evidence of this "counteraction," the Court cited the more than two-
hour delay between interrogations. 61 But under Miranda, this delay
would be characterized as part of the custodial atmosphere that cannot
help but wear down the accused's will to resist.62  Similarly, the fact
that a different police officer conducted each interrogation and that
different subjects were discussed at each could also be cited as evidence
of inherent coercion rather than police respect for Mosley's rights.
Finally, the Court held that the police could "reasonably interpret'
Mosley's statement that he did not want to answer "any questions about
the robberies" as not applying to subsequent questioning concerning a
robbery/murder. 3 Although this interpretation is reasonable, an
equally reasonable reading would hold that the statement did apply to
the crime for which Mosley confessed.
By relying on circumstances peculiar to Mosley, and refusing to
define specifically under what circumstances renewed police question-
ing will be held to "scrupulously honor" an accused's right to cut off
57. The Court was able to avoid making an explicit ruling on the last stage of the
Tucker analysis, note 38 supra, by simply defining the procedural rule so that the police
conduct in question was found permissible.
58. 96 S. Ct. at 326 (emphasis added).
59. See note 51 supra.
60. 96 S. Ct. at 326.
61. Id.
62. mhe very passage of time, while a person continues to be in police de-
tention will create fears and pressures undermining the will to insist on one's
right to silence and right to counsel.. . . The Court's language in Miranda
seems to be consistent with this view: (citing passage quoted in text accom-
panying note 16 supra.
ALI MODEL CODE OF PEE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 140.8(2)(d), comment at 52
(Prop. Official Draft, Apr. 15, 1975).
63. 96 S. Ct. at 327.
1976] 703
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
questioning, the Court has clearly rejected the Miranda approach of
providing concrete, objective guidelines which would enable a quick and
easy answer to the question whether the coercive pressures of custodial
interrogation had been overcome. Under the Mosley Court's vague
approach, each federal and state trial court must make a finding, based
on the facts unique to each case, whether the accused's right to cut off
questioning had been "scrupulously honored." The practical result will
be a lessening of appellate review in such cases because findings of fact
are difficult to overturn. 64  Consequently, the courts will, in all proba-
bility, admit confessions taken under conditions more coercive than
those that existed in Mosley."
It seems clear that the minority's conclusion that Mosley "signals
rejection of Miranda's basic premise" is correct.6 6  Mosley's holding,
that the inherent coercion of the custodial setting is dispelled by the
"scrupulous honoring" of the accused's right to cut off questioning, is
directly contrary to the principles of Miranda, which would hold that
"Mosley's failure to exercise the right upon renewed questioning was
presumptively the consequence of an overbearing in which detention
and that subsequent questioning played a central role." 67  Thus, Mir-
64. As a result of pre-Miranda ambiguity in the area of fifth amendment rights,
"Mhe Supreme Court repeatedly was presented with findings of voluntary confessions
in situations where the records made coercion quite likely. Powerless to overturn such
findings of fact, the Supreme Court stretched the definition of coercion to include the
lower courts' factual determinations." Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule,
supra note 5, at 1039. See, e.g., Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519 (1968), in which
the court found as a matter of law that the defendant's confession was involuntary.
65. Let there be no mistake about it. To a mind-staggering extent-to an ex-
tent that conservatives and liberals alike who are not trial lawyers simply can-
not conceive-the entire system of criminal justice below the level of the Su-
preme Court of the United States is solidly massed against the criminal suspect.
Only a few appellate judges can throw off the fetters of their middle-class back-
grounds-the dimly remembered, friendly face of the school crossing guard,
their fear of a crowd of "toughs", their attitudes engendered as lawyers before
their elevation to the bench, by years of service as prosecutors or as private
lawyers for honest, respectable business clients-and identify with the criminal
suspect instead of with the policeman or with the putative victim of the sus-
pect's theft, mugging, rape, or murder. Trial judges still more, and magistrates
beyond belief, are functionally and psychologically allied with the police, their
co-workers in the unending and scarifying work of bringing criminals to book.
Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 785, 792 (1970).
See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972) (en bane)
(confession held admissible even though defendant declined to talk on four separate
occasions); United States v. Brady, 421 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1970) (confession admitted
despite four previous assertions of the right to silence); United States v. Choice, 392 F.
Supp. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (confession held admissible even though severely injured
defendant declined to talk once, and refused to sign the waiver form at subsequent
interrogation).
66. 96 S. Ct. at 333.
67. Id. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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anda has been overruled in effect by Mosley. However, the case af-
firms Miranda in name and uses language from Miranda to identify the
first constitutionally required police procedure for custodial interroga-
tions.
But protecting a procedural right with the Constitution is of little
help to the accused if the "constitutional" procedure is defined so
vaguely that the police and courts can easily circumvent it. This
vagueness, combined with the Court's attitude of expanding the admissi-
bility of custodial confessions and a willingness to read facts to fit the
procedural requirement, seems certain to have the effect of freeing the
police from the restraint of' truly honoring the rights of the accused.
PILIP P.W. YATES
Criminal Procedure-The Right to Proceed Pro Se: Judicial
Gymnastics with the Sixth Amendment
Within the past two decades the United States Supreme Court has
been zealous in ensuring the right of defendants in state criminal
prosecutions to receive the assistance of counsel. The sixth amendment
guarantee of assistance of counsel to defendants in federal criminal
prosecutions has been extended to state criminal prosecutions under the
auspices of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' The
underlying premise of the "assistance of counsel" cases is that inherent
unfairness exists in any criminal proceeding in which the accused has
been denied the assistance of counsel to prepare his defense.' Argua-
bly, a natural extension of this reasoning might indicate that any convic-
tion obtained in a criminal trial absent representation by an attorney for
the accused is per se tainted and unfair. However, such an extension
clashes with an attempt by a criminal defendant to exercise the right of
self representation recognized on either a constitutional or a statutory
level by most state and all federal courts. This quandary raises the
question whether a state may constitutionally deny a valid request by a
1. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (requirement of assistance of
counsel before imprisonment for any offense); Gideon v. Wainwrigbt, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (requirement of assistance of counsel for defendants in state felony prosecu-
tions); see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (requirement of assistance of counsel
for defendants in state capital offense prosecutions).
2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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criminal defendant to proceed pro se and instead require that the
defendant be represented by an attorney, to forestall any subsequent
claim of prejudice by the accused based upon the absence of legal
guidance. Facing this novel issue in Faretta v. California," a divided
United States Supreme Court unequivocally held that state criminal
defendants have a constitutional right to proceed pro se upon a free and
knowledgeable waiver of assistance of counsel.4
The Faretta case arose out of a grand theft charge filed against
the defendant, Anthony Faretta, in the Superior Court of Los Angeles,
California. The trial judge granted defendant's request to proceed pro
se but retained flexibility to withdraw the ruling if it should later become
evident to the court that Faretta was incapable of effective self-represen-
tation.5 The judge subsequently examined Faretta's ability to represent
himself and withdrew Faretta's permission to proceed pro se after
expressing dissatisfaction with Faretta's responses concerning questions
of law.' The trial judge appointed a defense counsel' and denied
Faretta's requests for permission to act as co-counsel, forcing Faretta to
present his defense solely through his attorney.8 After his subsequent
3. 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975). Mr. Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion. Mr.
Chief Justice Burger, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissented and
joined in separate opinions written by Mr. Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice
Blackmun.
4. Id. at 2541.
5. The trial court based this ruling upon an earlier decision of the Supreme Court
of California in People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 499 P.2d 489, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233
(1972). In Sharp, the California Supreme Court held that an accused had no constitu-
tional right of federal or state origin to proceed pro se in California criminal trials.
Consequently, under the Sharp rule, permission to proceed pro se was a matter of
discretion for the trial judge. Sharp was decided under CAL. CoNsr. art. I, § 13 (1879):
"In criminal prosecutions, in any court whatever, the party accused shall have the right
. . . to appear and defend in person and with counsel. . . . (emphasis added)." Before
the Sharp decision was announced, section 13 was amended to clarify the status of self-
representation in California (the amendment was prospective only): "In criminal
prosecutions, in any court whatever, the party accused shall have the right. . . to have
the assistance of counsel . . . and to be personally present with counsel. . . . The
Legislature shall have power to require the defendant in a felony case to have the
assistance of counsel ...... CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 13 (emphasis added). In contrast,
thirty-six state constitutions explicitly provide criminal defendants with the right to
proceed pro se. Citations to the state constitutions are found in 95 S. Ct. at 2530 n.10.
Additionally, several state courts have declared that the United States Constitution
guarantees the right to proceed pro se. E.g., State v. Mems, 281 N.C. 658, 190 S.E.2d
164 (1972); Zasada v. State, 19 NJ. Super. 589, 89 A.2d 45 (App. Div. 1952).
6. Faretta was a high school graduate who had previously proceeded pro se in a
criminal prosecution. 95 S. Ct. at 2527. For excerpts from the colloquy between the
trial judge and Faretta at the sua sponte hearing, see id. at 2528 n.3.
7. Faretta's dissatisfaction with the public defender's office had precipitated his
request to proceed pro se. Id. at 2527.
8. Id. at 2529.
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conviction and the exhaustion of all avenues of appeal within the
California court system, 9 Faretta's petition for certiorari was granted by
the United States Supreme Court.10
The Supreme Court articulated the Faretta issue as "[w]hether the
Constitution forbids a State from forcing a lawyer upon a defendant
.... "11 The Court held that no state can constitutionally require a
criminal defendant to be represented by an attorney over the defendant's
protestations. Support for this conclusion came from three distinct
sources. First, the Supreme Court surveyed the unwavering protection
that the federal courts have afforded the right to proceed pro se in
federal criminal trials.' 2 Then, the Court analyzed the evolution of the
right to proceed pro se from the perspectives of the English common
law, colonial judicial practices, and the historical evolution of the sixth
amendment.' 3 Finally, the Court examined the tension between indi-
vidual autonomy and the potential unfairness of a criminal trial in which
the defendant represents himself.' 4
The right to proceed pro se in the federal court system is unques-
tioned since it has been expressly guaranteed to federal criminal defend-
ants under the Judiciary Act of 178915 and its successors.' 6 Yet,
historically the federal courts have taken a broader position with regard
to the right of self-representation thin mere statutory fiat. In Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCannl7 the trial judge allowed a criminal
defendant to proceed pro se and to waive trial by jury. The subsequent
trial court conviction was reversed by the court of appeals on the ground
that waiver of trial by jury is only effective when made with assistance of
counsel.V 8 However, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court convic-
tion, holding that a defendant may waive his constitutional rights to trial
9. Faretta's contentions concerning a constitutional right to proceed pro se were
summarily dismissed by the Califorhia appellate courts pursuant to the Sharp ruling. Id.
10. 415 U.S. 975 (1974).
11. 95 S. Ct. at 2531.
12. Id. at 2530-32.
13. Id. at 2532-40.
14. Id. at 2540-41.
15. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 92.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970) currently provides that: "In all courts of the United
States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by
the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes
therein." The right to proceed pro se also is granted to criminal defendants under FED.
PL CPms. P. 44(a).
17. 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
18. United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1942). Learned
Hand delivered the opinion of the court of appeals.
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by jury and to assistance of counsel provided that the waivers are
knowingly and freely made.' 9
The main issue in Adams was the validity of a waiver of an
affirmative constitutional right, e.g., trial by jury, in the absence of
assistance of counsel to advise the defendant of the consequences of such
a waiver. But the Supreme Court nevertheless outlined its views on the
right to proceed pro se via dictum:
The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to dis-
pense with a lawyer's help are not legal formalisms. They rest on
considerations that go to the substance of an accused's position
before the law. The public conscience must be satisfied that fair-
ness dominates the administration of justice. An accused must have
the means of presenting his best defense. He must have time and
facilities for investigation and for the production of evidence. But
evidence and truth are of no avail unless they can be adequately
presented. Essential fairness is lacking if an accused cannot put
his case effectively in court. But the Constitution does not force
a lawyer upon a defendant. He may waive his Constitutional right
to assistance of counsel if he knows what he is doing and his choice
is made with eyes open .... 20
Subsequently, in Carter v. Illinois21 the Supreme Court reinforced the
Adams dictum by declaring that "[n]either the historic conception of
Due Process nor the vitality it derives from progressive standards of
justice denies a person the right to defend himself ... *22 But the
Court retreated from interference into state criminal procedure concern-
ing the waiver of constitutional rights by stating:
But the Due Process Clause has never been perverted so as to force
upon the forty-eight States a uniform code of criminal procedure.
... The Constitution commands the States to assure fair judgment.
Procedural details for securing fairness it leaves to the States. 23
Thus, in Carter the focus of the Court centered upon achieving a fair
outcome in a criminal proceeding rather than providing the defendant
with an opportunity to proceed pro se. Although the actual holding is
expansive with regard to the latitude given a criminal defendant to waive
the affirmative constitutional right of trial by jury without assistance of
19. 317 U.S. at 275.
20. Id. at 279 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
21. 329 U.S. 173 (1946). In Carter, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of
petitioner who had pleaded guilty to murder without the assistance of counsel. The
Court refused to carry its scrutiny past the common law record of the case to determine
the validity of the waiver.
22. Id. at 174.
23, Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
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counsel, the fairness concerns expressed by the Court put the decision
into a different perspective, casting shadows on the reach of the Adams
dictum.
The courts of appeals have directly held in several cases that the
right to proceed pro se is constitutionally protected by the sixth amend-
ment and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 24  The
first analytically significant case espousing the right of self-representa-
tion as an affirmative constitutional right is United States v. Plattner2 5
In Plattner, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals elevated the right to
proceed pro se to the level of the constitutional safeguards expressly
enumerated in the sixth amendment and further stated that the right of
self-representation could not be construed as merely statutory in ori-
gin.26 The court of appeals then declared that denial of self-representa-
tion was prejudicial per se2 and required automatic reversal when a
defendant had been denied the right to proceed pro se without any
attempt by the trial court to ascertain the adequacy of -the accused to
waive his constitutional right to assistance of counsel.2 8
Although the majority in Faretta was quite comfortable with the
prevailing court of appeals viewpoint, the dissenters were reluctant to
embrace a court of appeals doctrine founded, at least in part, upon the
sketchy Adams and Carter dicta. Mr. Chief Justice Burger pointed out
in his dissent that Adams and Carter dealt specifically with the conse-
quences of a waiver of trial by jury and a guilty plea, repsectively, made
without the assistance of counsel. Hence, the issue was not whether the
accused had an affirmative right to proceed pro se but whether uncoun-
seled waivers of fundamental constitutional rights were per se defec-
24. E.g., United States v. Warner, 428 F.2d 730 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
930 (1970); Lowe v. United States, 418 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1048 (1970); United States v. Stemman, 415 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 907 (1970); Arnold v. United States, 414 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1021 (1970); United States ex rel. Maldonaldo v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966); United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d
271 (2d Cir. 1964). Contra, Van Natton v. United States, 357 F.2d 161 (10th Cir.
1966) (right of self-representation solely statutory right).
25. 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964). The case involved the use of assigned counsel to
argue a petition for a writ of error coram nobis filed by defendant after his conviction
for interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle. Defendant had prepared the
petition himself, and he appealed from the district court order dismissing the petition on
the ground that the district court erred in refusing to allow him to represent himself
at the hearing.
26. Id. at 273.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 276.
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tive.29 Since the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions in both
Adams and Carter, the obvious answer is that a defendant may waive
his constitutional rights in some circumstances. However, in Singer v.
United States30 the Supreme Court declared that "[t]he ability to waive
a constitutional right [e.g., trial by jury] does not ordinarily carry with
it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right.131  The Court in
Singer found that no prejudice could result from a refusal to permit
waiver of a constitutional safeguard because the defendant then receives
exactly what the Constitution requires for his protection. 32 This logic
could arguably be extended to the issue of self-representation in that
denial of the right to proceed pro se may be viewed as resulting merely
in the exercise of the constitutional right of assistance of counsel. In
any event, the judicial background on the right of self-representation,
standing alone, is somewhat less than conclusive in forming a constitu-
tional basis for an affirmative right to proceed pro se.
As a supplement to the judicial viewpoint, the majority finds
support for its position in parallel developments in the English common
law, colonial trial practices, and the legislative context of the sixth
amendment itself. Presently, an individual has an affirmative right of
self-representatfibn under the English common law.33 But this is hardly
surprising or probative in that common-law defendants were historically
forced to proceed pro se.34 Indeed, it was not until 1836 that the last
vestiges of compulsory self-representation in felony prosecutions were
removed by statute.3 Similarly, colonial trial procedures regularly
afforded the defendant the opportunity to represent himself, 0 but
whether this practice arose from respect for individual liberties or
whether the practice was fostered by common law traditions derived
from the dearth of trained counsel in the colonies is not readily ascer-
tainable.
The majority also cited the legislative history of the sixth amend-
ment as indicative of an affirmative constitutional right to proceed pro
29. 95 S. Ct. at 2544.
30. 380 U.S. 24 (1965). In Singer, defendant was convicted of federal mail fraud
charges in a jury trial despite repeated demands by him for trial by the judge alone. The
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Id. at 25, 36.
31. Id. at 34-35.
32. Id. at 36.
33. R. v. Woodward, [1944] K.B. 118.
34. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MATLA4ND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAvi 211 (2d ed.
1923).
35. 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114, § 1 (1836).
36. 95 S. CL at 2537.
[Vol. 54
1976] THE RIGHT TO PROCEED PRO SE 711
se. Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789,37 guaranteeing the right
of self-representation in the federal courts, just one day prior to the
submission of the sixth amendment to Congress for its approval.2s In
the subsequent congressional debate on the sixth amendment, reference
to the right to proceed pro se was conspicuously absent.3 9 The majority
propounded that this was indicative that the right to self-representation
was deemed by all to be so pervasive and fundamental that it was a non-
issue.4" However, this logic raised the inevitable question of why
Congress affirmatively granted the right to proceed pro se in a federal
statute if such a right was considered inherent and patently obvious. The
dissenters found the Court's argument unpersuasive in that the statutory
grant of the right to proceed pro se and the corresponding omission in
the sixth amendment, which had been drafted by essentially the same
persons, lent credence to the inference that the exclusion was pur-
poseful.41 Neither viewpoint could legitimately be termed persuasive.
The final and most compelling argument of the majority was the
necessity of protecting individual autonomy.4" The Court made no
effort to side-step the central premise in Gideon v. Wainwright" and
Argersinger v. Hamlin44 that fundamental fairness requires that an
accused be represented by counsel. 45 Rather, the Court conceded that
the average criminal defendant who proceeds pro se will indeed dimin-
ish the likelihood of a successful defense in his case.4 6 However, the
37. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 92.
38. 95 S. Ct. at 2539.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2546.
42. See generally Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due
Process, 54 MINN. L. Ruv. 1175 (1970); Comment, Self-Representation in Criminal
Trials: The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, 59 CALuF. L. Rav. 1479 (1971); Note,
Constitutional Law-Right to Counsel-Self-Representation Not Guaranteed by Sixth
Amendment, 18 N.Y.L.F. 990 (1973).
43. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
44. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
45. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
46. 95 S. Ct. at 2540. Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
68-69 (1932), presented the classic critique of the pro se defense:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not com-
prehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged
with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the
indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left
without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
prepare his defense, even though he had a perfect one. He requires the guid-
ing hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it,
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Court refused to entwine personal liberties with statistical probabilities
and stated that respect for individual freedom, even if exercised in an
apparently self-destructive manner, demands an affirmative right for an
individual to conduct his own defense.4 At no other time are individual
liberties more precious to a citizen than when a state subjects that
citizen to the rigors of its criminal justice process. 48  Accordingly, in the
very hour of need, a defendant should be afforded the widest possible
latitude to prove his innocence to give the constitutional safeguards of
the sixth amendment their fullest meaning.
The dissenting opinions did not belittle the value of individual
autonomy and free choice within the criminal justice system. But the
dissenters found a preeminent government interest in insuring a just
result through compulsory assistance of counsel. 49 In the criminal
courts the prosecution and the trial judge must insure that true justice is
realized to maintain public confidence in the efficacy of the criminal
justice process.5" Objective standards of impartiality require that court
systems appoint attorneys for defendants without counsel since the
majority of the populace feels that representation by counsel is a neces-
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not
know how to establish his innocence.
47. 95 S. Ct. at 2540.
48. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (reversal of
conviction of "D.C. Nine" who had vandalized the Dow Chemical Corporation's District
of Columbia offices). Although the trial judge had granted defendants latitude with
respect to addressing the trial court, he had denied defendants' petition to proceed pro se.
In reversing the conviction, the court of appeals expounded on the nature of the right to
proceed pro se:
It [the right of self-representation] is designed to safeguard the dignity and
autonomy of those whose circumstances or activities have thrust them involun-
tarily into the criminal process. An accused has a fundamental right to con-
front his accusers and his "country," to present himself and his position to the
jury not merely as a witness or through a "mouthpiece," but as a man on trial
who elects to plead his own cause. He is not obliged to seek what counsel
would record as a victory but what he sees as tantamount to condemnation or
doubt rather than vindication. A defendant has the moral right to stand alone
in his hour of trial. The denial of that right is not to be redeemed through
the prior estimate of someone else that the practical position of the defendant
will be enhanced through representation by another or the subsequent conclu-
sion that defendant's practical position has not been disadvantaged.
Id. at 1128.
49. 95 S. Ct. at 2543, 2548.
50. Grano, supra note 42, at 1196. The Supreme Court articulated this view in
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) (conviction of petitioner for conspiracy to
utter counterfeit notes). In reversing the conviction because of improper prosecutorial
conduct, the Supreme Court declared: 'The United States Attorney is the representative
not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done." Id. at 88. Similar language may be found in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963).
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sary precondition to a fair trial.51 Continued public support for the
judicial process is dependent upon widespread popular sentiment that no
arm of the state or federal governments will strip a citizen of his rights
except through meticulous adherence to procedures deemed most likely
to produce just results.51 Mr. Justice Blackmun concluded that the
criminal justice system could not assuage the damage to society inherent
in unjust outcomes by pointing to the vindication of an individual's right
to proceed pro se. Conversely, Mr. Justice Blackmun reasoned that any
damage to individual freedom resulting from denial of the pro se
privilege would be mitigated by the greater fairness of a trial with
assistance of counsel. Complaints about the fairness of criminal pro-
ceedings from a convicted defendant who received the full benefit of the
express constitutional right to assistance of counsel ring hollow despite
the abridgement of individual autonomy. 3
Despite the skepticism of the dissenters, there are rational reasons
for a criminal defendant to seek to proceed pro se.54 The glaring flaw
in the dissenters' position is their assumption that appointed counsel will
provide effective representation for indigent defendants. :Patently, the
empirical norm for appointed counsel does not approach total effective-
ness. Blatant incompetence has appropriate remedies both in the trial
court and at the appellate level. But marginally inadequate represefita-
tion presents an insidious dilemma for the indigent defendant under the
minority view. Faretta's request to proceed pro se was rooted in his
belief that the public defender could not devote the time that Faretta felt
was necessary for a successful defense.55 Under California law, the sole
basis for reversal for ineffective representation is a showing by the
accused that the errors of defense counsel reduced the trial to a "sham
and a farce. 56  Clearly, a defense limited by the time and budgetary
constraints of the public defender's office might be "inadequate" in
certain circumstances and yet not constitute a "sham and a farce." If
the appointed counsel proves ineffective, the accused must either sit
mute and sustain the consequences or he must waive his fifth amend-
51. Grano, supra note 42, at 1195-96.
52. Id.
53. 95 S. Ct. at 2548.
54. Possible rational reasons for seeking to proceed pro se are: (1) distrust of
appointed counsel and/or the legal process as a whole; (2) political motivations; (3)
faith in the ultimate vindication of an innocent defendant by the judicial system; and (4)
the tactical desire to gain empathy with the jury. Note, 18 N.Y.L.F., supra note 42, at
996.
55. 95 S. Ct. at 2527.
56. People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963).
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ment right to silence and testify in his own behalf. This situation is
constitutionally untenable as the accused is, in fact, forced to waive his
right to remain silent to present a viable defense. To forestall this
dilemma, qualitative guarantees of effective representation must accom-
pany any denial of the right to proceed pro se. Without such guaran-
tees, the dissenters' position is constitutionally defective.
The majority opinion is praiseworthy at the very least for its
concern with freedom of individual choice. With the present awesome
concentration of power in governmental bodies, any minor victory for
individual autonomy is meritorious on its face. However, society's
interest in achieving a fair and impartial judicial process must predomi-
nate over the autonomy interest. Public doubt concerning the fairness
of criminal proceedings strikes at the very core of government. While
paying lip service to this ideal, the minority's position fails to insure the
essence of a fair trial, i.e. effective assistance of counsel. Until the
Supreme Court deals decisively with the spectre of inadequate represen-
tation for indigent defendants that haunts many criminal proceedings,
the right of self-representation must remain unfettered. Hopefully, if
the Supreme Court does promulgate guidelines to guarantee effective
representation for indigent defendants, the Court will re-examine the
Faretta decision in the context of the preeminent public interest in
ensuring justice in the trial courts.
MICHAEL S. IvEs
Federal Income Tax-Use of Installment Sale Reporting for Sales
Between Related Taxpayers: The Separate v. Single Economic
Entity Argument
Nye v. United States,' a case of first impression,2 presented the
issue whether a purported installment sale by a wife to her husband,
followed by an outright disposition of the property by the husband to a
1. No. C-374-D-73 (M.D.N.C., May 16, 1975) [hereinafter cited as The District
Court Opinion]. The case was decided on a stipulation of facts and cross motions for
summary judgment. The United States initially appealed the case to the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit (Court of Appeals No. 75-1905) but subsequently withdrew the
appeal. Counsel for plaintiffs in Nye reports that he has received correspondence from
attorneys in a number of other jurisdictions who are currently involved with factually
similar cases. Interview with R. Roy Mitchell Jr., attorney for plaintiffs, in Durham,
North Carolina, Jan. 20, 1976. Apparently the Internal Revenue Service has decided to
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INSTALLMENT SALE REPORTING
third party, could qualify for installment sale treatment under section
453 of the Internal Revenue Code.3 The court, after determining that
the form of the transaction comported with the requirements for install-
ment sales treatment,4 approached the section 453 question on the basis
of whether the marriage relationship alone was sufficient to preclude use
of the installment sale reporting method.5 Although noting that trans-
actions between husband and wife that have significant tax conse-
quences are traditionally viewed with suspicion," the court, by holding
for the taxpayers here, refused to allow that relationship, standing alone,
to defeat an otherwise valid installment sales agreement.7
Plaintiffs, husband and wife, were both active professionals, he a
lawyer and she a medical doctor.8 Both had achieved a considerable
degree of financial success and maintained completely separate records
and accounts of their respective financial affairs.9 In 1964 plaintiff
wife, on the advice of her husband, purchased certain stock for approxi-
mately 30,000 dollars. 10 For this purchase she used money from her
separate account, and after acquisition of the stock always listed it as
her separate property on state tax returns." The investment was a sig-
nificant financial success and by early 1969, when she sold the stock
to her husband, the stock was worth slightly more than ten times the
original purchase price.12
As part of his separate business dealings plaintiff husband was
obligated under a construction financing agreement to make a 100,000
dollar payment to a third party in mid-1969 and had clearly sufficient
personal resources to meet this obligation.'3 However, instead of using
let Nye stand as the law in the Middle District of North Carolina while continuing to
litigate the point in other jurisdictions. This is a fairly standard tactical approach by the
Service in hopes of getting a favorable trial court decision on similar facts, and
approaching any appellate resolution in the position of appellee rather than appellant.
2. The District Court Opinion at 8.
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 453(b).
4. The District Court Opinion at 10.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 11-12.




12. Plaintiff wife initially invested $30,134.00 in the stock of Colorcraft Corp.
After a corporate reorganization she received 834 shares of Fuqua Industrial Preferred
"B" stocks in exchange for her Colorcraft shares. At the time of the transaction
between plaintiffs husband and wife, the husband purchased from her 334 shares of the
Fuqua stock. Her per/share basis at the time of sale was $36.13 with a per/share
market price at that time of $363.77. See id. at 3-4.
13. Id. at 4.
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his own resources outright, he decided to purchase a portion of the
greatly appreciated stock from his wife with a view toward resale to
obtain the required cash.14  Both plaintiffs were aware of the planned
resale and of the tax postponement reasons for the initial sale.1 The
sale of the wife's stock to her husband was structured as an installment
purchase at four percent interest 16 and met all of the technical require-
ments set forth in section 453 of ,the Internal Revenue Code for such a
transaction.1 7
Plaintiff husband resold most of his newly acquired shares within a
six month period, realizing and reporting a short-term capital loss on the
plaintiffs' 1969 joint tax return. On the stock sold to her husband
plaintiff wife reported a long-term capital gain totaling more than
109,000 dollars on plaintiffs' joint 1969 and 1970 tax returns using the
installment reporting method.18  The stipulated purpose of the transac-
tion was to allow the wife to postpone the full payment of the long-term
capital gains tax by spreading it over a twelve year period.'"
The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the installment sale re-
porting method and its attendant tax consequences upon audit of plain-
tiffs' 1969 and 1970 tax returns and assessed a deficiency plus interest,
which totaled more than 30,000 dollars. Plaintiffs paid the defi-
ciency and, after having exhausted all administrative remedies, sued
for refund of the deficiency assessment in United States District Court.20
At trial the government advanced two arguments, both of which
viewed plaintiffs as a single economic entity with the effect of placing
the seller wife in the position of having at least indirect control of the
entire sale proceeds 2' rather than a fractional share as required by
section 453. The government first pressed a "substance over form"
argument on the basis of its assertion that the sale in question was no
14. Id.
15. Id. at 6.
16. Id. at 4. Some point is made in the opinion and briefs about the low four
percent interest rate involved here. However, the 'rate is clearly irrelevant to the
discussion or resolution of the problem as it will result in a "wash" on plaintiffs' joint
return. So long as the interest is actually paid and reported, as was the case here, the
income that was received by the wife would exactly equal the income deduction
allowable to the husband. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 163, 267.
17. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 453(b). For the form of the transaction in the
instant case see The District Court Opinion at 4.
18. The District Court Opinion at 5.
19. Id. at 4, 6.
20. The suit was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1970). The District
Court Opinion at 2.




more than a single complete transaction involving one taxpaying unit,
the plaintiffs husband and wife.22 Relying on Commissioner v. South
Texas Lumber Co.,23 which states that the installment method of report-
ing was included in the Internal Revenue Code as a relief provision
for taxpayers who receive only a small portion of the sale price in the
year of sale, the government argued that this "well-coordinated tan-
dem" '24 (referring to the plaintiffs) indeed received the entire selling
price in the year of sale. The second argument advanced by the gov-
ernment was the "step transaction doctrine, ' 25 a theory under which
ostensibly separate transactions are viewed merely as steps in complet-
ing a single transaction. Here again the entire argument hinged on
the treatment of the plaintiffs as a single unit or entity, because the
argument is simply that despite the separate sales actually involved, the
effect of the transaction was no more than a single sale of stock by the
plaintiffs husband and wife.
The basic problem in any case involving an installment sales
agreement, and one specifically confronted by the court in Nye,26 is to
establish an appropriate standard by which to test the validity of the
transaction. As the court in Nye recognized, 7 no prior case offered a
sufficiently similar fact pattern to be of serious precedential value in the
context of installment sales between related taxpayers. The court, how-
ever, found in Rushing v. Commissioner" a standard which could be ap-
plied to installment sales transactions in general.29 Rushing established
as the test for validity whether the seller has achieved, regardless of the
form employed, the same result as if he had made an outright sale. 0 If
he has, then installment treatment will be disallowed because the seller
22. Id. at 13.
23. 333 U.S. 496, 503 (1948), cited in Brief for Defendant at 10.
24. Brief for Defendant at 13.
25. Id. at 17. For more on the "step transaction doctrine" see B. BITrKER & J.
EusTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 101-03 (3d
ed. 1971).
26. The District Court Opinion at 9.
27. Id. at 8.
28. 441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971). In Rushing the taxpayers' wholly owned
corporation had sold all of its assets pursuant to a section 337 plan of liquidation. After
the sale they created an irrevocable trust for their children with a bank as trustee and
sold their corporate stock to the trust in an installment sale transaction. The trustee
then authorized and received the distribution of the corporate assets. The government
argued that plaintiffs were then taxable on the entire liquidating distribution. The court
found the controlling factor to be whether the taxpayer had ever gained or retained
control over the proceeds. Relying on the independent nature of the trustee, the court
ruled that he had not and that the installment sale was therefore valid.
29. The District Court Opinion at 9.
30. 441 F.2d at 598.
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will have the full economic return of the transaction at his immediate
disposal and thereby be able currently to absorb the full tax conse-
quences. Thus the question in the husband and wife context presented
in Nye is indeed reduced to whether the couple will be treated as single
or separate economic entities. This is the crucial issue because the
Rushing test would disallow installment sales treatment when the seller
received even indirect control of the proceeds or economic benefit of
the entire transaction.3'
It is clear that for most non-tax purposes husband and wife are
treated as separate legal entities. Unlike the earlier common-law ap-
proach, it is now well settled that they may own separate property, that
their individual contracts are binding even with each other,3 2 and that
they may establish legitimate debtor-creditor relationships.3 " The legal
trend is quite obviously toward more individual autonomy for each
spouse. Of course, to say that husband and wife are separate legal
entities may not be to say that they are or should be separate economic
entities for purposes of the special situation of joint filers under the
federal income tax law. The filing of a joint return is an election by
married taxpayers to be treated as an economic unit for tax purposes,3 4
and because it is elective it is chosen by the informed taxpayer (as the
plaintiffs in Nye unquestionably were) only when it produces a tax
advantage.35
The court in Nye decided that on the facts presented the wife and
husband were indeed separate economic entities, 0 even though they
filed jointly for federal tax purposes. The court found it impossible on
the facts presented to find that plaintiff wife maintained either direct or
indirect control over the economic benefit of the outright sale of the
stock by her spouse to a third party.3 7 At the very least, the opinion if
followed means that the Internal Revenue Service may not "automatical-
31. Id.
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10 (1966). This statute establishes the validity of
contracts between husband and wife in North Carolina.
33. See Battle v. Mayo, 102 N.C. 413, 9 S.E. 384 (1889). This case held that
notes executed by husband payable to wife constitute a valid indebtedness.
34. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6013 governs joint returns.
35. The use of a joint return will produce a tax advantage when there is a
difference in the percentage contributed by each spouse to the net taxable income. This
is true even in the higher tax brackets. For example, if we assume a total net taxable
earned income of $60,000 split 40/20, the total tax filing separately would be $22,740;
while the tax filing jointly would be $22,300 or a savings of $440. This result is
produced using the 1975 tax rates.




ly and perfunctorily [conclude] that any person is the agent of his or
her spouse for the purposes of section 453(b) installment method
reporting,"3 8 even though in the court's own words such a rule would be
"valid in the vast majority"39 of such transactions.
The court did not discuss Revenue Ruling 73-15711 which states:
"A taxpayer may not use the installment method to report gain from sale
to a related taxpayer who pursuant to a prearranged plan resells the
property to a third party and receives full payment in the year of sale."41
The ruling seems to be on point in a situation like that presented in
Nye. Surprisingly, the court did not mention the ruling although it was
cited by one of the parties. 42 The only logically consistent conclusion
given the facts here is that the court rejects the ruling's validity. While
plaintiffs in Nye asserted that the ruling was not applicable because the
transaction involved did not fit the "prearranged plan" language,43 this
is a strange position given the stipulation that both plaintiffs were at all
times aware of the planned resale to a third party.44 Indeed if the
arrangement in Nye did not fit the ruling it is impossible to imagine any
set of facts that would, and the court's failure even to mention the ruling
may only be construed as an absolute rejection of it.
The opinion in Nye also stands in sharp contrast to earlier decisions
that rejected attempts by taxpayers .to interject controlled corporations
between themselves and third party purchasers when the controlled
corporation paid the purchase price to the seller in installments and the
seller in turn reported the sale using the installment method. 5 Of
course, in that context there is no question about the seller's control of
the resale transaction, a control that the court in Nye refused to find in
the husband-wife context when the only evidence was the existence of
the marriage relationship.4 6
In holding for plaintiffs in Nye the court was strongly influenced
by the separate and individually successful careers of the taxpayers and
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Rev. Rul. 157, 1973-1 Cum. BULL. 213.
41. It is interesting to note that this Revenue Ruling was not issued until after the
controversy in Nye arose. It is fairly common for the Internal Revenue Service to
attempt to create favorable "law" in this manner looking toward trial, and this may
explain the court's complete disregard of the ruling.
42. Brief for Plaintiff at 5, Nye v. United States, No. C-374-D-73 (M.D.N.C., May
16, 1975).
43. Id.
44. The District Court Opinion at 6.
45. E.g., Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355 (1939).
46. The District Court Opinion at 11-12.
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their maintenance of "substantial personal estates separate and apart
from each other."41  The court apparently believed that such circum-
stances are extremely unusual (as evidenced by the comment that the
government's approach would be "valid in the vast majority" of such
cases), and that any opportunity for tax savings that might arise under
this decision will therefore be limited.48 In fact, at a time when the
number of families in which the husband and wife have separate ca-
reers is increasing, the impact of the decision may be greater than the
court seemed to believe. While few husbands and wives may find
it necessary to keep separate business records and accounts, those for
whom it is necessary are likely to have the largest combined incomes and,
therefore, are most likely to own property of sufficient value to derive
appreciable benefit from use of an installment sales agreement. This
could mean that the dollar effect of the decision in Nye will be signifi-
cant.
CONCLUSION
Given the facts presented in Nye, the current state of the relevant
statutory law regarding treatment of spouses as separate legal entities
and the evident trend toward expansion of such treatment, the decision
must be viewed as sound. It is difficult to fault the court's reasoning as
to its finding that the husband and wife in Nye are separate economic
entities, however easy it may be to question its evident conclusions about
the potential effect of the decision. Nonetheless, when taxpayers choose
to avail themselves of the advantages of the joint filing method, it would
not be unreasonable to require by statutory modification of the Internal
Revenue Code that couples so reporting be denied the use of the
installment reporting method for sales to each other. Completely deny-
ing installment reporting for sales between related persons would ignore
the clear realities of some modem transactions between husband and
wife. The former suggestion would have the effect of requiring couples
who wish to use the installment reporting method to establish the
requisite criteria for treatment as separate economic entities and to
declare a willingness to be taxed as such by foregoing the advantages of
the joint return.
JOHN GARRETT PARKER




Labor Law-The Relationship of Title VII to the National Labor
Relations Act
In Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organ-
ization' the United States Supreme Court was faced with the problem
of reconciling the national policy of non-discrimination in employment
as embodied in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI) 2
with the exclusive bargaining principle of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA or the Act).3 The Court held that concerted activities by a
group of minority employees attempting to bargain collectively with
their employer over allegedly racially discriminatory employment prac-
tices would not be protected by the NLRA. Resolving this issue in
favor of the traditional approaches to exclusive bargaining, the Court
dealt reformers a temporary setback, but preserved the integrity of the
procedures of the Act.
The National Labor Relations Act was enacted by Congress "to
promote industrial peace and the improvement of wages and working
conditions by fostering a system of employee organization and collective
bargaining."4 The Act establishes the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board) to oversee and carry out its provisions. Section 7 of
the Act 6 creates certain basic rights of employees; section 8 of the
Act7 protects these rights from interference by employers or unions."
However, other sections and policies of the Act restrict the scope of
section 7. Therefore, although certain employee conduct may conform
to the precise language of section 7, that section will afford the individu-
1. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000eto e-17 (Supp. II, 1972).
3. 29 id. §§ 141-87 (1970).
4. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); see NLRA §§ 1, 101, 29 U.S.C. §§
141, 151 (1970).
5. NLRA §§ 3-6, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-56 (1970).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor or-
ganization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158 (a) (3)
of this title.
7. Id. § 158(a).
8. Id. § 158(b).
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al no protection if his actions are repugnant to other provisions of the
Act.'
One of the recognized section 7 rights is the employee's right "to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection."' 0  In cases such as NLRB v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co." the courts have interpreted this right to be
limited by the principle of section 9(a)12 that the authorized bargaining
agent will be the exclusive representative of all employees in the bar-
gaining unit.'3 As a result, it has generally been held that section 7
does not protect employees who undertake to utilize economic pressure
independent of their bargaining representative in seeking to deal with
the employer over wages, hours or other conditions of employment.1 4
The underlying policy of Title VII is the achievement of equality in
employment through the elimination of discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.'5 The Equal Employment
9. An unprotected employee is subject to employer discipline, which is otherwise
proscribed by section 8 (a) (1).
10. See note 6 supra.
11. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) provides in part: "Representatives designated or
selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a
unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.. .."
13. E.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330 (1953); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); J.I. Case
Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 216
(9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944).
14. NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v.
Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944); Getman, The Protection of Economic
Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. RE'V. 1195,
1197, 1242 (1967).
The employee's right to individually order his relations with his employer are
sacrificed under the Act in order to promote the policy that the most effective bargaining
tool of employees is that of pooling their economic strength and acting through a chosen
labor organization. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. at 180. Therefore,
"the majority-rule concept is today unquestionably at the center of our federal labor law
policy." Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility
in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1333 (1958).
However, in order to prevent a tyranny of the majority and safeguard the interests
of the minority of bargaining unit members, the courts have imposed upon the bargaining
agent a concomitant duty to fairly represent all members of the bargaining unit. Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Accord, Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330 (1953). The duty can be enforced either by a suit for damages, see, 6.g., Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.R., supra, or by filing an unfair labor practice charge with the Board,
see, e.g., Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
15. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
429-30 (1971).
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Opportunities Commission (EEOC) was created to inplement this
policy through a system of voluntary compliance.1 6 Title VII prohibits
discrimination by both employers17 and unions' s and can be seen as a
response to unfair treatment of minorities by both and a reflection of a
national policy against discriminatory employment practices.' 9 One of
the protections offered by Title VII is section 704(a)20 which makes it
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because
he has opposed practices made unlawful by the statute. Although there
has been no definitive pronouncement on the scope of the provision, 2'
the Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that section 704(a) will
cover employee "participation in legitimate civil rights activities or pro-
tests.
22
The dispute before the Court in Emporium Capwell originated in
a report issued by the Department Store Employees Union (the Union)
supporting charges made by a group of employees that the Emporium
Capwell Co. (the Company or the Employer) was engaging in racially
discriminatory employment practices.2 3  The collective bargaining
agreement between the Union and the Company contained, among other
provisions, a no-discrimination clause 24 and a system of grievance and
16. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
429-30 (1971).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2) (Supp. II, 1972).
18. Id. § 2000e-2(c) (2).
19. Comment, Federal Courts as Primary Protectors of Title VII Rights, 28
RUTGERS L. REV. 162, 165 (1974).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-3 (a) (Supp. 11, 1972) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discrim-
inate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an em-
ployment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprentice-
ship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to
discriminate against any individual; or for a labor organization to discriminate
against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has op-
posed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter,
or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any man-
ner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subehapter.
21. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420
U.S. at 71-72 n.25.
22. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 799 (1973).
23. The main concern of the employees was the case of Russell Young, a black
passed over for promotion allegedly because of his race. On the basis of the Union's
report, Young was later promoted to the position of first assistant manager prior to the
start of the picketing. The Emporium and Western Addition Community Organization,
192 N.L.R.B. 173, 180-81 (1971) (trial examiner's decision). The trial examiner's
decision is found appended to the NLRB decision. Id. at 179-86.
24. Section 21(E) provided: "No person shall be discriminated against in regard to
hire, tenure of employment or job status by reason of race, color, creed, national origin,
age or sex." Id. at 180 (trial examiner's decision).
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arbitration procedures to handle all alleged contract violations.2" The
Union stated that it was prepared to take these allegations before the
Adjustment Board and all the way to arbitration, if necessary. 20 A
meeting of the Adjustment Board was set, and employees Tom Hawkins
and James Joseph Hollins, the subjects of this litigation, were scheduled
to testify on behalf of the Union. However, when called upon at the
proceeding, they refused to participate, 27 thus preventing resolution of
the grievance. Later, Hawkins and Hollins held a press conference and
publicly charged the Company with employment discrimination against
racial minorities. 28 Afterwards, they commenced picketing and pam-
phleting in front of the Company's store,'m and were subsequently
notified by the Company that repeated acts or statements of this nature
would result in their discharge.30 In spite of this, they resumed their
activities and, as a result, received discharge slips."'
A charge against the Company was subsequently filed with the
NLRB by the Western Addition Community Organization 32 on behalf
25. Section 5(B) provided: "Any act of any employer, representative of the Union,
or any employee that is interfering with the faithful performance of this agreement...
may be referred to the Adjustment Board for such action as the Adjustment Board deems
proper, and is permissive within this agreement." Id. (trial examiner's decision).
Sections 36(B)-(F) described the functions of the Adjustment Board and provided
for submission of a grievance to final and binding arbitration at the request of either
of the parties if the Adjustment Board cannot settle the issue. Id.
The collective bargaining agreement also contained a no-strike-no-lockout clause in
section 36(A), id., and provided that the Union would be the sole bargaining agent for
all employees. 420 U.S. at 53.
26. The feeling was expressed by sonie employees that the contract procedures were
insufficient and that something "dramatic" was needed. They urged the Union to picket
the Company. The Union responded by saying that the collective bargaining agreement
prohibited picketing and that, although the proceedings would take time, the beneficial
effects would be more widespread and longer lasting. 420 U.S. at 54.
27. At the meeting, Hawkins and Hollins read a statement objecting to processing
the grievance on an individual basis, calling for group action and demanding a meeting
with the Company's president. They then walked out. 192 N.L.R.B. at 181 (trial
examiner's decision).
28. The conference was held with the local media after an unsuccessful attempt by
Hollins to meet and negotiate with the Company's president. Id.
29. The pamphlets basically reiterated the charges made at the press conference
and called for a boycott of the Employer's store. They referred to the Company as a
"racist pig" and "a 20th century colonial plantation" and compared its operations to
those of "the slave mines of South Africa." Id.
30. In a written warning, the Company claimed that the charges made by the
employees were untrue and deliberately designed to injure its reputation. After stating
that there were ample remedies already in existence to correct any alleged discrimina-
tion, the Company warned that discharge would follow a repetition of the same conduct.
Id. at 181-82.
31. The Union did not advise the parties to picket and later urged them to follow
the Union's program through arbitration, warning them that their picketing could result
in their being fired. Id. at 182.
32. The Western Addition Community Organization is a local San Francisco civil
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of Hawkins and Hollins, alleging that their discharge violated section
8(a)(1) of the NLRA. s3 After conducting a hearing, the NLRB Trial
Examiner found in favor of the Company,34 concluding that the conduct
of the employees was not protected by section 7 because it was disrup-
tive of the collective bargaining relationship existing between the Union
and the Company."; The NLRB, on review, adopted and affirmed the
findings and conclusions of the trial examiner.3"
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed, 37 stating that "concerted activity involving racial dis-
crimination has a unique status"3 and cannot be treated as limited by
section 9(a) in the same manner as are other section 7 concerted
activities. The principle of the exclusivity of the bargaining representa-
tive must be read as restricted by the national policy against racial
discrimination in employment incorporated in Title VII. 39 On certiorari,
a majority of the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in an
opinion written by Mr. Justice Marshall.40
rights association. Both Hawkins and Hollins were members at the time of their
discharge. 420 U.S. at 57.
33. 29U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
34. 192 N.L.R.B. at 179 (trial examiner's decision).
35. In keeping with the traditional view that section 9(a) acts as a limitation on
section 7 rights, the trial examiner stated:
[TMo extend the protection of the Act to the two employees named
would seriously undermine the right of employees to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, handicap and prejudice the em-
ployees' duly designated representative in its efforts to bring about a durable
improvement in working conditions among employees belonging to racial mi-
norities, and place on the Employer an unreasonable burden of attempting to
placate self-designated representatives of minority groups while abiding by the
terms of a valid bargaining agreement and attempting in good faith to meet
whatever demands the bargaining representative put (sic) forth under that
agreement.
Id. at 186.
36. The Emporium and Western Addition Community Organization, 192 N.LR.B.
173 (1971) (mem.). Members Jenkins and Brown filed dissenting opinions. The
former based his conclusion on the belief that the conduct was protected by section 7 as
a concerted activity in spite of the limitations of section 9(a), while the latter found that
the employees were not seeking to collectively bargain with the Employer, but rather to
discuss the situation with the Company.
37. Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (Wyzanski, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 927.
39. The appellate court held: "[T]he Labor Board should inquire, in cases such
as this, whether the union was actually remedying the discrimination to the fullest
extent possible by the most expedient and efficacious means. Where the union's efforts
fall short of this high standard, the minority group's concerted activity cannot lose its
section 7 protection." Id. at 931 (emphasis in original).
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Wyzanski objected to the use of this test on the
grounds that minority concerted activities in opposition to racial discrimination should be
protected in all circumstances, regardless of the conduct of the union. Id. at 932.
40. 420 U.S. 50. The Supreme Court accepted the conclusion of both the trial
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In reaching its holding that plaintiffs' picketing was not protected
by the NLRA, the Court reaffirmed the traditional interpretations of
three central areas of the Act. First, the Court asserted that the rights
of employees as delineated in section 7 are to be viewed as collective, not
individual, rights which will be protected only to the extent that employ-
ees act in furtherance of the NLRA policy of fostering collective bar-
gaining.41  Second, the Court upheld section 9(a)'s principle of exclu-
sive representation as a limitation on section 7, even in cases of racial
discrimination, thus rejecting the view of the appellate court.42 Finally,
the Court reemphasized the importance of the grievance-arbitration
procedures established in the collective bargaining agreement, especially
when, as in Emporium Capwell, the contract contains a no-discrimina-
tion clause.4" Arbitration is to be preferred to separate bargaining or
economic pressure, in keeping with the strong federal policy in favor
of arbitration of labor disputes.44
The Court also addressed itself to the question of the proper weight
to be afforded the policies of Title VII in the context of an NLRA
proceeding. The decision makes it clear that the NLRB is not the
proper forum for the pursuit of relief for Title VII violations and that
these violations will not be treated as per se unfair labor practices
under the Act.45  However, as has been required by prior Supreme
Court decisions, 46 a government agency, such as the NLRB, cannot
ignore other congressional policies in administering an act entrusted to
examiner and the Board that the employees were seeking to bargain collectively with the
Employer, rather than just to present grievances or discuss the situation. The Court
confined its consideration of the case to this issue. Id. at 60-61.
Mr. Justice Douglas filed the lone dissent and would have affirmed the appellate
court decision based on the belief that minority concerted activities are protected by
section 7 and that to find otherwise is to make all employees prisoners of their union. Id.
at 73.
41. Id. at 61-62.
42. Id. at 65-66.
43. Id. at 66-67.
44. The federal policy favoring the arbitration process is specifically recognized by
the NLRA in section 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970), and has been judicially
developed in a long line of cases. See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW., 414 U.S. 368
(1974); Boys Market, Inc. v. Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
45. 420 U.S. at 70-72. The contrary result has been argued for by a number of
parties, including respondents in this case, because of what is seen as the inadequacy of
the Title VII remedies and the ineffectiveness of the EEOC in processing complaints.
46. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942); cf. McLean Trucking
Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 80 (1944).
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it. As the Court conceded,47 the rights created by the Act might have
to be broadened to accommodate the policies of Title VII, under the
proper circumstances. Nevertheless, although such outside policies
should be considered, the Court implied that they should not be given
preeminence over policies inherent in the Act without a more express
congressional mandate.
Specifically, the Court announced that the primary policy of the
NLRA will continue to be the encouragement and protection of the
system of collective bargaining. The standards and requirements of
Title VII will not be read into the Act. As the Court stated:
This argument [by employee-plaintiffs] confuses employees' sub-
stantive rights to be free of racial discrimination with the procedures
available under the NLRA for securing these rights. Whether
they are thought to depend upon Title VII or have an independent
source in the NLRA, they cannot be pursued at the expense of
the orderly collective bargaining process contemplated by the
NLRA.48
The Court thus refused to follow the recommendations of certain com-
mentators that the role of the Board and of the Act be expanded in the
area of racial discrimination.49 The contentions that concerted activities
aimed at the elimination of racial discrimination should receive special
status under the Act and that the NLRA should thus provide yet
another remedy for aggrieved racial minorities were rejected. Policies
of racial non-discrimination were treated as secondary to the NLRA's
preeminent policy of insuring industrial tranquility through a system of
collective bargaining.
Although not expressed by the Court, the subordination of the
policy of antidiscrimination in employment to that of fostering collective
bargaining can be explained in the following manner. The elimination
of racial discrimination has always been a valid concern. of the NLRA,
as safeguards have been provided against its occurrence.50 However,
47. 420 U.S. at 73 n.26.
48. Id. at 69.
49. Gould, Racial Protest and Self Help Under Taft-Hartley: The Western Addi-
tion Case, 29 Aim. J. (n.s.) 161 (1974); Comment, Labor Law Meets Title VII:
Remedies for Discrimination in Employment, 6 CONN. L. Rlv. 66 (1974); Comment,
The Inevitable Interplay of Title VII and the National Labor Relations Act: A New
Role for the NLRB, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 158 (1974).
50. These safeguards include, among others, the duty of fair representation imposed
upon the bargaining agent. See note 14 supra. Also, the Board has held that racial
discrimination on the part of the union is an unfair labor practice. Hughes Tool Co.,
147 N.LR.B. 1573 (1964); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement
denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
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this concern springs not out of an express policy within the Act, but
from the realization that the existence of racial discrimination in em-
ployment invites industrial strife. Employees are thus protected from
discriminatory practices by the Act not as an end in itself, but as a
means to the end of industrial peace. This conclusion is supported by
recent statements made by the Board's former General Counsel" and
the Board decision in the case of Jubilee Mfg. Co. 52
There appear to be only two flaws in this otherwise well-reasoned
opinion by the Court. The first of these involves the Court's reaffirma-
tion of the arbitration process in the context of charges of employer
racial discrimination."3 This language would seem to run counter to the
Court's decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co." which held that
weaknesses present in the arbitration system render it inferior to the
federal courts as a proper forum for determination of Title VU viola-
tions. However, this inconsistency may be resolved by reading the
Court's approval of arbitration in Emporium to be limited solely to its
appropriateness as a procedure for determining whether racial discrimi-
nation has in fact occurred, when the collective bargaining agreement
contains a no-discrimination clause. 5
The second problem presented by the Court's decision occurs in
part MI of the opinion. Having established that the concerted activities
of the employees were not protected by section 7 and, therefore, that
discharge by the Employer was proper, the Court stated that this "does
not mean that the discharge is immune from attack on other statutory
grounds in the appropriate case." 5  The Court implied that, in a
51. Nash, Board Referral to Arbitration and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver: Some
Preliminary Observations, 25 L.AB. L.J. 259, 264-65 (1974).
52. 202 N.L.R.B. 272 (1973), wherein the Board stated:
[I]n our view, discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national ori-
gin, standing alone . . . is not "inherently destructive" of employees' Section
7 rights and therefore is not violative of Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act.
There must be actual evidence . . . of a nexus between the alleged discrimina-
tory conduct and the interference with, or restraint of, employees in the exer-
cise of those rights protected by the Act.
Such discrimination can be violative of Section 8(a) (1), (3) and (5) in cer-
tain contexts. . . . However, in each of these areas in which we have decided
issues involving discrimination there has been the necessary direct relationship
between the alleged discrimination and our traditional and primary functions
of fostering collective bargaining ....
Id. at 272-73.
53. 420 U.S. at 66-67.
54. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). The Court held that an adverse arbitration decision wil
not foreclose to the employee-complainant the right to file charges with the EEOC.
55. The Court stated: "The grievance procedure is directed precisely at determining
whether discrimination has occurred." 420 U.S. at 66 (footnote omitted).
56. Id. at 72.
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separate action filed before the EEOC challenging the validity of the
discharge under section 704(a), the Employer's conduct might be
found to violate Title VII. Thus, under the remedial provisions of Title
VII, Hawkins and Hollins could conceivably be reinstated in their jobs
and awarded back pay.517 The end result of the Emporium Capwell
litigation would then be merely that plaintiffs sought a proper remedy
through an improper forum. This incongruous result seems to stem
from the Court's overly zealous desire to segregate the spheres of influ-
ence of Titie VII and of the NLRA. Although the Court's language was
purely dictum, this possibility of an inconsistent result under Title VII
should have been foreclosed.
Another significant aspect of the Emporium opinion is presented in
footnote 12,18 wherein the Court for the first time dealt with the
question of the proper interpretation of the proviso of section 9(a).59
Although this treatment is dicta, the Court took the opportunity to
endorse the interpretation of the proviso advanced by the Second Cir-
cuit in Black Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists.60 Black
Clawson held that the individual employee's "right" under the proviso
to approach the employer to present grievances was not an "absolute"
right, but rather conferred upon the employee only the privilege of pre-
senting such grievances. The employer is not placed under a duty to
entertain these complaints. 6' With regard to the purpose of the statu-
tory language, the Second Circuit stated:
The proviso was apparently designed to safeguard from charges
of violation of the act [section 8(a) (5)62] the employer who vol-
untarily processed employee grievances at the behest of the individ-
57. Id.
58. Id. at 61 n.12.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970), wherein the proviso states:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall
have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have
such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representa-
tive, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-
bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the
bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such ad-justment.
For a history of the section 9(a) proviso prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley
amendments to its language and a discussion of those amendments, see Sherman, The
Individual and His Grievance-Whose Grievance Is It?, 11 U. PrTr. L. REv. 35 (1949).
60. 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962); accord, Broniman v. A.&P. Tea Co., 353 F.2d
559 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 907 (1966).
61. 313 F.2d at 185.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970), which states: "It shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer-to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) [NLRA 9(a)] of this title."
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ual employee, and to reduce what many had deemed the unlimited
power of the union -to control the processing of grievances.0 3
Thus, the Supreme Court adopted the so-called "employer defense"
reading of the section 9(a) proviso. By so doing, the Court further
indicated that the NLRA does not permit employees to utilize economic
pressure in order to influence the employer's decision whether to exer-
cise his proviso option. This conclusion is consistent with the Court's
disposition of Emporium.64
The Emporium decision raises a significant question: Would the
result have been the same had the union been unwilling and unready to
properly process the employees' grievances? Although a resort to self-
help by minority employees would appear to be more easily justified in
this situation, there are several factors that militate towards an extension
of the application of the picketing prohibition of Emporium to these
facts as well. First and foremost, employees have access to a sufficient
number of alternative remedies to preclude the need for the additional
one sought by respondents. The most obvious remedy is a suit against
the union for breach of its duty to ensure fair representation of all
employees. 65 Employees can also utilize the statutory cause of action
for employment discrimination provided by Title VII. Finally, the
District of Columbia Circuit has held that racial discrimination by an
employer sufficiently interferes with an employee's section 7 rights to
constitute an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA.6 Although these remedies may arguably lack the speed and
effectiveness of picketing, they should be preferred because they are less
disruptive of the labor-management relationship than picketing, provide
for an orderly determination of whether racial discrimination does in
fact exist before action is taken and are already in existence and would
not require any strained re-interpretation or restructuring of the provi-
63. 313 F.2d at 185.
64. A resort to self-help either for the purpose of forcing an employer to bargain
collectively with a minority of employees or to pressure an employer to hear individual
grievances under the section 9(a) proviso is proscribed by the opinion in Emporium.
Therefore, the proviso has been rendered a hollow promise, since it cannot be enforced
by a proceeding under the Act or by economic coercion.
65. See note 14 supra. However, a violation of the duty of fair representation
occurs only when the union's conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967), citing Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) and
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
66. United Packinghouse Workers Union v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969). However, the Board has specifically refused to
follow this approach in Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272 (1973).
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sions of the Act.6" Second, to allow minority self-help, even when the
union is not aiding the minority, would be inequitable to the employer.
In addition to the examples mentioned by ,the Court,6 the prejudice to
the employer is demonstrated by the fact that during the course of
collective bargaining, an employer will make concessions in order to
avoid the disruption of his business occasioned by employee picketing.
To allow minority employees -to picket him because of derelictions on
the part of the union is to injure him doubly. Therefore, industrial
peace will be preserved without undue interference with the rights of the
minority employees by prohibiting minority economic pressure in ac-
cordance with the decision in Emporium.
The decision in Emporium should not be read to indicate a weak-
ening of the Supreme Court's commitment to the eradication of racial
discrimination in employment. Rather, it evidences a balancing of
policy considerations, resulting in the emphasis of the smooth operation
of the federal system of labor relations at what the Court views as a
nominal inconvenience to the civil rights movement. If employee pro-
tection beyond that offered by the present provisions of Title VII is
needed, Congressional legislation is the proper solution. The Supreme
Court should not, and apparently has declined to, judicially redirect the
NLRA to achieve this result.
STEVEN WILLIAM SUFLAS
Securities Regulation-United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman: The Supreme Court Refines the Howey Formula
For the sixth time1 since the passage of the Securities Act of 1933,
the United States Supreme Court in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman2 has gone in search of a workable definition of "security." The
67. For a discussion of these and other alternative remedies see Note, Racial
Discrimination in Employment and the Remedy of Self-Help: An Unwarranted
Addition, 15 WM. &MARY L. REV. 615 (1974).
68. 420 U.S. at 67-69.
1. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959);
SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332 (1967).
2. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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Depression-era Congress that passed the 1933 Act3 left the definition 4
unbounded in its haste to write legislation halting the virtually unregu-
lated5 traffic in speculative, groundless stock. 6  The Supreme Court
must walk along the penumbra of the Act, sorting those interests which
fall within its light from those without. If the interests the purchaser-
litigant holds are "securities" within the Act, he gets the advantage of a
federal forum7 and lenient fraud rules.8 For the issuer-litigant, inclusion
in the Act means that his securities must undergo a lengthy and expen-
sive registration or exemption process before they may reappear on the
market. The Court's principal tool for distinguishing a security from
other interests is the test developed in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,'0 which
finds a "security" whenever "the scheme involves an investment of
money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the
efforts of others."" The Court in Forman refined the test so that now a
transaction comes within the definitional sections of the Securities Act
whenever investors are motivated to risk their capital by a significant,
realistic"2 expectation of substantial13 profits (capital appreciation or
3. See Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 29 (1959).
4. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1970) [hereinafter cited
as 1933 Act]:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or
other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, tempo-
rary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
The definition of "security" in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a) (10), 15
U.S.C. 78c(a)(10) (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1934 Act], is virtually identical and for
present purposes the coverage of the two Acts may be considered the same. 421 U.S. at
847 n.12.
5. By 1933, all forty-eight states except Nevada attempted in some degree to
regulate the sale of securities. However, state "Blue Sky" laws, designed to halt
"speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of 'blue sky'," Hall v.
Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917), were unable to cope with interstate sales.
6. See the parade of horribles in F. PECORA, WALL SrREET UNDER OATH (1939).
Mr. Pecora was counsel to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency during
the 1933-1934 investigation of securities abuses.
7. 1933 Act, § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1970).
8. 1934 Act, § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5 (1975).
9. 1933 Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
10. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
11. Id. at 301.
12. See text accompanying note 52 infra.
13. See text accompanying note 55 infra.
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participation in earnings)14 to come solely from the efforts of others.
Plaintiffs in Forman are residents of Co-Op City in the Bronx,
New York City. Reputed to be the largest housing cooperative' 5 in the
United States,'" the development's 200-acre site containing thirty-five
high rise buildings and 236 townhouses is home for approximately
50,000 people. The project was built between 1965 and 1971 primari-
ly with funds procured under the New York Private Housing Finance
Law, known as the Mitchell-Lama Act.1  The Act is designed to
encourage private developers to build low-cost cooperative housing by
providing them with long-term low interest mortgage loans and substan-
tial tax exemptions. In return, the developer must agree to operate the
facility "on a' non-profit basis," and to submit to state review of the
project.' s
Defendant United Housing Foundation (UHF) is a non-profit
amalgam of labor unions and civic groups formed to secure decent
housing for low and moderate income persons. UHF organized River-
bay Corporation to issue the Co-Op stock and to operate the project.
UHF contracted with its wholly-owned for-profit subsidiary, Communi-
ty Services, Inc. (CSI), to serve as general contractor for Co-Op City.
The Mitchell-Lama Act allowed UHF to lease only to low income
individuals who were approved by the state, with preference given to
veterans, the aged and the handicapped.' 9  In May, 1965, Riverbay
circulated an Information Bulletin"0 seeking to attract residents to Co-
Op City. To acquire an apartment, a prospective tenant had to pur-
chase 450 dollars worth of Riverbay stock for each room desired. There
14. See text accompanying note 51 infra.
15. In a cooperative, a corporation is formed to purchase an apartment building.
Tenants buy stock in the corporation entitling them to a lease in the apartment building
and a vote in the election of directors who manage the corporation. Miller, Cooperative
Apartments: Real Estate or Securities?, 45 B.U.L. REv. 465 (1965). In a condominium
the owner is given fee title in the unit with all the tax advantages of home ownership.
The fee interest is restricted to the interior walls and the air space contained between
them; all other parts of the dwelling, such as the exterior walls, are held in common
ownership with the other owners. Comment, Community Apartments: Condominium or
Stock Cooperative?, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 299, 300-01 (1962).
16. Forman v. Community Serv., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
17. N.Y. Priv. Hous. FIN. LAw § 1 et seq. (McKinney 1962), as amended,
(McKinney Supp. 1975).
18. 421 U.S. at 840-41.
19. Id. at 841 & n.1, 842.
20. The Bulletin estimated the total cost of the project, based on an anticipated
construction contract with CSI, to be 283.7 million dollars. Of this sum, 250.9 million
dollars (88.4 percent) was to be financed by a forty-year low interest mortgage loan
from the state. The remaining 32.8 million dollars (11.6 percent) was to be raised by
the sale of Riverbay stock to tenants. Id. at 843.
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was no possibility of capital appreciation on resale of the stock since a
departing tenant was required to offer the shares at their initial selling
price to Riverbay or to a state-approved prospective tenant. The
shares could not be pledged or encumbered and would descend, along
with the apartment, only to a surviving spouse. Each apartment was
entitled to one vote in the affairs of the cooperative irrespective of the
number of shares owned. The Bulletin stated that after construction
of the project, mortgage payments and current operating expenses
would be defrayed by the tenants' monthly rent. The Bulletin esti-
mated that the average monthly cost would be twenty-three dollars per
room. Several times during construction of Co-Op City, Riverbay se-
cured state approval and revised its contract with CSI to compensate
the latter for increased construction costs and expenses not reflected
in the Bulletin. To meet these increases, Riverbay procured 125 mil-
lion dollars in additional mortgage loans from the state. As a result,
the average monthly rental charges increased periodically, reaching al-
most forty dollars per room as of July, 1974.21
Faced with a rental charge that had skyrocketed to 73 percent
above that predicted in the Information Bulletin, purchasers of the Co-
Op stock sued in federal court alleging violations of section 17(a) of the
1933 Act and rule lOb-5 promulgated under the 1934 Act.22 Plaintiffs
claimed that the Bulletin misrepresented that CSI would absorb any
subsequent cost increases above the contract price, and that the Bulletin
failed to disclose material facts about CSI. 3 Defendants (UHF, CSI,
Riverbay, individual directors of these organizations, the State of New
York and the State Private Housing Finance Agency) moved to dismiss
for want of federal jurisdiction in that the Riverbay shares were not
"securities" within the definitional sections of the federal Securities Acts.
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss based on "the
fundamental nonprofit nature of this transaction" that presented "the
insurmountable barrier to plaintiffs' claims in this federal court. '24 The
21. Id. at 845-46.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975) promulgated under
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
23. The alleged omissions are noted in 421 U.S. at 844 n.s. Plaintiffs also
presented a claim against the State Financing Agency under the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), and ten pendent state law claims. However, the resolution of the
jurisdictional issue precluded a hearing on the merits of these causes. 421 U.S. at 845,
859-60.
24. 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). However, noted Judge Pierce "[f
ever there was a group of people who need and deserve full and careful disclosure in
connection with proposals for the use of their funds, it is this type of group. By law, they
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed on two grounds. 5
Since the Information Bulletin called the shares "stock," the Second
Circuit first held that the Securities Acts, which explicitly include
"stock" in their definitional sections, were literally applicable. The court
reached the same result by alternatively concluding that the shares
plaintiffs held were "investment contracts" under the definitional sec-
tions of the Acts as identified by the profit test developed in Howey.26
The court of appeals found an expectation of profits sufficient to satisfy
Howey from three sources: 1) rental reductions resulting from the
income produced by commercial facilities that were also established at
Co-Op City (professional offices, parking spaces and community wash-
ing machines); 2) tax deductions; 27 and 3) savings resulting from Co-
Op City's low rent. 8
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that the
Riverbay shares were not "securities" within the Securities Acts. The
majority began by calling attention to Congress' stated intent in defining
the term "security" in the 1933 Act "to include . . . the many types
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary
concept of a security. 2 9  The Court rejected a literal reading of the
definitional section's inclusion of "stock," holding that form should be
disregarded in favor of substance and that the emphasis should be on
economic reality.30 However, said the Court, the name given to an
interest is not wholly irrelevant. As a matter of evidence, the name an
issuer appends to the interests he sells may be relevant to show that
investors justifiably assume that the federal securities laws apply. In the
present case, however, "[c]ommon sense suggest[ed] that people who
intend to acquire only a residential apartment . . for their personal
would not be eligible for occupancy in Co-op [sic] City unless their financial resources
were limited. . . The cost of housing demands a good percentage of their incomes.
Their savings are most likely to be minimal, and they probably don't have lawyers or
accountants to guide them. Further, they are people likely to put a great deal of
credence in statements made. . . by reputable civic groups and labor unions, particularly
when the proposal is stamped with the imprimatur of the state." Id. at 1125.
25. 500 F.2d 1246 (1974).
26. Id. at 1252-53.
27. INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 216 allows Co-Op City tenants to deduct their
proportionate share of real estate taxes paid by the cooperative housing corporation on
the land and buildings, and for interest paid by the corporation on its indebtedness under
the contract of acquisition, construction and maintenance. A tenant who used his
apartment for business purposes could depreciate the portion of the building used in a
trade or business or for the production of income.
28. 500 F.2d at 1254.
29. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933) (emphasis added).
30. 421 U.S. at 848, citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
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use, are not likely to believe that in reality they are purchasing invest-
ment securities simply because that transaction is evidenced by some-
thing called a share of stock."31  The Court also held that a Riverbay
share was not an investment contract since a crucial element of the
Howey test-profit-was found lacking. The Court undertook to
define profit as "capital appreciation" or a "participation in earnings
resulting from the use of investors' funds."32  Two of the indicia of
profit used by the court of appeals were rejected summarily. The tax
benefits, said the Court, "are nothing more than that which is available
to any homeowner who pays interest on his mortgage." 3 The reduced
rental charge, which the Court attributed to the state's mortgage loan,
"no more embodies the attributes of income or profits than do welfare
benefits, food stamps or other government subsidies."' 4  The Court
admitted that income from the commercial leases "is the kind of profit
traditionally associated with a security investment."35 However, it
found this income "far too speculative and insubstantial to bring the
entire transaction within the Securities Acts.""0
The term "investment contract," which has become the outer edge
of at least one facet of the federal definition of "securities," came into
the 1933 Act via37 the Uniform Sale of Securities Act.3 8 When the
31. 421 U.S. at 851.
32. Id. at 852.
33. Id. at 855.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 856.
36. Id. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and White, dissented in an
opinion supportive of the Second Circuit's reasoning. Id. at 860.
37. "With regard to the subject of definitions, I may say that we have attempted to
follow the Uniform Sale of Securities Act; and so when we come to the definition of
securities I think you will find that we have taken almost verbatim the language of the
Uniform Sale of Securities Act." Testimony of Houston Thompson, one of the drafters
of H.R. 4314 (which definition was used in the conference bill, H.R. 5480, the Securities
Act of 1933). Hearing on H.R. 4314 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1933).
38. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CoNFEREcNE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAws 171, 173 (1929). UNIFORM SALE OF SECURITIES AcT § 1(1):
"Security" shall include any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation, or right to sub-
scribe to any of the foregoing, certificates of interest in a profit-sharing agree-
ment, certificates of interest in an oil, gas or mining lease, collateral trust cer-
tificate, pre-organization certificate, pre-organization subscription, any transfer-
able share, investment contract, or beneficial interest in title to property,
profits or earnings or any other instrument commonly known as a security; in-
cluding an interim or temporary bond, debenture, note, certificate, or receipt
for a security or for subscription to a security.
The Act was withdrawn by the commissioners in 1943 to be replaced in 1956 with the
Uniform Securities Act. As of 1974 this legislation has been adopted in some form by
twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia, including North Carolina. HANDBoOK
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Uniform Commissioners picked up the term in 1929, it had already
acquired a fixed judicial definition.3 9 The leading case interpreting the
phrase was State v. Gopher Tire and Rubber Co.,4" which held that an
investment contract was created whenever an issuer "sold its certificates
to purchasers who paid their money justly expecting to receive an
income or profit from the investment ... .
The Supreme Court first confronted "investment contracts' in SEC
v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.42 Defendant Joiner acquired leases to
3,002 acres of McCulloch County, Texas, to drill an oil well. In order
to finance drilling, Joiner offered sub-leases of parcels ranging in size
from -two and one-half to twenty acres. The sub-leaseholds would
appreciate astronomically if oil were struck. Mr. Justice Jackson chose
not to define "investment contract," holding rather that "the reach of the
[Securities] Act does not stop at the obvious and commonplace. Novel,
uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also
reached if it be proved as a matter of fact that they were widely offered
or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which established their
character in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or
instrument commonly known as a "security." "',4 Mr. Justice Murphy
crystallized the definition of investment contract three years later when
he wrote the Howey opinion.44 "[An investment contract for purposes
of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a
person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party. . .."45
State courts began to chafe under the restrictive federal definition.
Judge Traynor was the first to break away in Silver Hills Country Club
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNiFoRM STATE LAws 1013,
1024 (1974). See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78A-1 to -64 (1975).
39. People v. White, 124 Cal. App. 548, -, 12 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Dist. Ct. App.
1932).
40. 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920).
41. Id. at 56, 177 N.W. at 938. One can argue that the Supreme Court's restrictive
definition of profit was alien to the Gopher court and the framers of the 1933 Act.
Purchasers of certificates in Gopher received monetary dividends and a ten percent
discount on all purchases from the issuer. Chancellor Lees arguably used the alternative
form "income or profits" in his definition to distinguish cash returns (income) from non-
monetary benefits (profits). However, this argument does not take into account the
philosophy of Blue Sky laws, which is generally more paternalistic than that of the
federal Securities Acts.
42. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
43. Id. at 351.
44. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
45. Id. at 298-99.
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v. Sobieski46 in which he developed the "risk capital" approach. Pro-
moters in Silver Hills were selling memberships in a yet to be developed
country club to the public. Judge Traynor held that those who risked
their capital along with others in a common venture in the expectation
of some benefit-not restricted to monetary profit-were entitled to the
protection of California's Blue Sky law. The Supreme Court of Hawaii
followed this lead in State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.,4' with the best
articulated alternative to the Howey test. The court held that for
purposes of the Hawaii Act, an investment contract is created whenever:
"(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and (2) a
portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enter-
prise, and (3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the
offeror's promises or representations which give rise to a reasonable
understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above
the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the opera-
tion of the enterprise, and (4) the offeree does not receive the
right to exercise practical and actual control over the managerial
decisions of the enterprise."'48
The Forman Court's definition of profit as capital appreciation or
participation in earnings constitutes a rejection of the broader benefit
analysis undertaken in Silver Hills and Hawaii Market. Judge Traynor
in Silver Hills held that purchasers of the country club memberships
were entitled to the protection of the securities laws "whether or not they
expect[ed] a return on their capital in one form or another. '4 9 The
Supreme Court of Hawaii adopted this reasoning when it required for
application of the state Blue Sky law only that purchasers have a
reasonable expectation "that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and
above the initial value, will accrue . . . ."5 Plaintiffs in Forman
advocated a similar benefit profit analysis, urging the Court to accept as
profit the savings of money that might otherwise have gone for more
expensive housing and higher taxes. The Court rejected this argument,
however, stating that such a finding would be overly broad, in that a
desire to obtain the greatest amount at least cost "characterizes every
form of commercial dealing."51
The Court's requirement and definition of "profits" in Forman has
the effect of clarifying and constricting the already narrow Howey prof-
46. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
47. 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
48. Id. at 648-49, 485 P.2d at 109.
49. 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 909, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
50. 52 Hawaii at 649, 485 P.2d at 109.
51. 421 U.S. at 858.
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its test. The added requirement that investors be motivated to risk their
capital by a significant, realistic expectation of a profit excludes those
interests that attract consumers rather than investors. Purchasers who
buy an interest with the intent to realize enjoyment through use of the
interest are consumers. They cannot at the same time, the Court
implied, have a significant, realistic expectation of realizing Howey-type
profit on their investment. This follows despite the fact that many
interests will show capital appreciation upon resale, regardless of use
during ownership. 52
In discussing the net income derived from leasing Co-Op City
space to commercial facilities as "too speculative and insubstantial to
bring the entire transaction within the Securities Acts"53 the Court
served notice that only the expectation of substantial profits will trigger
inclusion of an interest in the Acts. This introduces a threshold concept
into the securities definition absent from previous cases that may give
the Court and the securities bar additional headaches. The threshold of
substantial profits in Forman was to be considered in relation to the
volume of income the project generated. True, said the Court,54 the
commercial leases bring in more than one million dollars per year, but
this sum is a gross income figure calculated before expenses are netted
out. In any case, the majority believed that the net income from com-
mercial leases was insignificant in relation to Co-Op Citys' total income.
Despite the vagueness that such a threshold concept introduces, it is in
harmony with the Court's purpose of looking beyond form to economic
reality. Where the profit element is such a minor inducement to
potential purchasers as it was in the Forman case, the Court does not
believe that the potentially burdensome protections of the Securities Acts
are warranted.55
Among the unstated assumptions of the Court in Forman was the
52. An exception to this rule is the sale of interests in certain resort condominiums
and cooperatives, which interests the SEC treats as securities. This result follows where
the interests are offered and sold with the emphasis on the economic benefits to be
derived by purchasers from the managerial interest of others through participation in a
rental pool arrangement. Here the SEC apparently believes that the character of the
issuer's offering is so compelling that purchasers must have a significant, realistic
expectation of profit from the transaction. Release No. 5347, Securities Act of 1933, 38
Fed. Reg. 1735 (1973).
53. 421 U.S. at 856.
54. Id.; see note 22 supra.
55. The requirement of substantial profit would seem to undercut the SEC's
inclusion of all resort condominium offerings which meet the tests in Release No. 5347,
note 52 supra, in the Securities Acts. Arguably, only those plans in which the income a
purchaser can receive from rental pooling is substantial qualify as securities.
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idea that the Securities Acts should only take cognizance of investment
risk taking. Since to date every family that has withdrawn from Co-Op
City has received back its full original payment, the Court found that
Co-Op purchasers "take no risk in any significant sense." 6 It is true
that plaintiffs do risk loss of their initial investment if Co-Op City
becomes bankrupt. But, said the Court, in view of the state's 375
million dollar sunken investment, "bankruptcy in the normal sense is an
unrealistic possibility." 51  Plaintiffs in Forman risked only the loss of
the benefit of their bargain, a risk the Court says is unlike the kind of
fluctuating value risk associated with securities investments.5 8
Another consideration that may have influenced the Court was the
risk of ruinous civil liablilty that non-profit issuers like Co-Op City face
under the Securities Acts, even if they are exempted from disclosure
requirements of registration. This risk could frighten away charitable
organizations from participation in similar future ventures. The most
fearsome of these civil liabilities arises under rule 10b-5, promulgated
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, which makes it illegal to engage
in any manipulative or deceptive practices in connection with the sale of
any security. The rule also forbids the making of any untrue statement
of material fact, or the omission of any fact necessary to prevent a
statement from being misleading.59 While the amount of scienter that
plaintiff must show to establish a lOb-5 cause of action is unsettled, it is
clearly less than that required for common law fraud.60 The require-
ment of reliance on the misrepresented fact or material omission appears
to have been relaxed,61 and the Supreme Court has held that in consid-
ering the causal link between defendant's actions and plaintiff's loss,
the fraud need only "touch" the sale of the securities.62 Although the
Court disposed of Forman on the jurisdictional issue, had plaintiffs
penetrated this first line of defense it appears that they would have had
no difficulty surviving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under IOb-5.
56. 421 U.S. at 857 n.24.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
60. Compare Lanza v. Drexel, 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) with White v.
Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
61. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Reliance was presumed where the device employed was
such as would cause reasonable investors to rely thereon. However, the case involved an
enforcement action by the SEC rather than a private suit for damages.
62. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
[Vol. 54
THE HOWEY FORMULA REFINED
The Court may have also worried that inclusion of the Co-Op
interests in the Securities Acts would confer on the SEC jurisdiction
that might interfere with other state and federal regulatory schemes. The
Co-Op City interests are functionally similar to real property interests,
and the regulation of real property in our federal system has traditional-
ly been entrusted to the states. In addition, said the Court, New York's
Housing Commissioner reviewed "virtually every step" in the develop-
ment of Co-Op City.63 Given an existing state regulatory mechanism
operating in an area traditionally the domain of the states, the Court
may have been reluctant to impose on this project a competing regulato-
ry scheme. While no federal agency presently regulates condominium
and cooperative housing such as that involved in Forman, the Court
noted64 that Congress recently ordered the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development to conduct a thorough review of these relatively
new property interests. 65 HUD was named as lead agency and the
SEC was given no role in the study. If the exclusive choice of HUD
for the investigation represents Congressional intent rather than Con-
gressional oversight, the SEC's limited jurisdiction over resort condo-
miniums and cooperatives68 may soon terminate.
Two significant and related trends emerge from the Forman deci-
sion. First, the majority opinion represents a significant narrowing of
the Howey test. For an interest to be classified as a security after
Forman, it must produce capital appreciation upon resale or periodic
returns on the investment, in substantial amounts, and purchasers must
have a significant, realistic expectation of such profits. The second
trend, the result of the narrowing of Howey, is the closing of the
Securities Acts to consumer interests like those involved in Forman.
The Court has clearly pronounced that consumers must look elsewhere
than to the Securities Acts for protection.
W. WooDs DOSTER
63. 421 U.S. at 841.
64. Id. at 859 n.26.
65. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 89 Stat. 740.
66. See note 46 supra.
1976]

